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ABSTRACT
A n employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) is a
deferred compensation program that qualifies under
Internal Revenue Code (IRC)

section 401 to grant tax

benefits to corporations and employees of corporations.
A corporation receives a tax benefit by transferring
shares of its own stock to a tax exempt trust
established for the benefit of its employees.

(ESOT)
The

employees are not taxed until distributions from the
trust are received,

and taxation at that time is

favorable.
Since ESOPs are related to t a x i n c e n t i v e s , the
issue of tax policy has been raised.

Advocates of ESOP

tax incentives maintain that ESOPs benefit society by
increasing business efficiency.

This increased efficiency

is a result of increased productivity of workers who are
motivated by their participation in ESOPs.
The objective of this study was to provide ESOP
policy makers with empirical evidence w h i c h would be u s e 
ful in the formulation of future ESOP policy.
cally, the investigation attempted to reveal
vii

Specifi
(A) whether

any relationship exists between company operating p e r 
formance and ESOPs and (B) the nature of any r e l a t i o n 
ship which might be found to exist.
This investigation was carried out in three
phases.

First,

an econometric model was formulated

which could be used to test the general hypotheses of
the study.

Second.,-the data for the model were c o l 

lected through a questionnaire survey of 1136 potential
ESOP companies.

Third, the data were analyzed and the

hypotheses were tested by statistically validating the
model.
A multiple linear regression model was specified
using company profit as the criterion variable and certain
quantifiable characteristics of an ESOP as explanatory
variables.

Normalized versions of operating income and

after-tax net income were used as profit measures to form
two separate models when regressed against the common set
of explanators.

The analysis was cross-sectional in nature

since the data collected on the questionnaires represented
company activity for the year of 19 77.
Of the 1136 companies surveyed,
estimated to actually be ESOP companies.

750 to 850 are
A total of 16 5

usable replies were received resulting in a response rate
of approximately 20%.

The replies were distributed as

follows:
• »•
Vill

Manufacturing companies

80

Trading companies

40

Service companies

45

Total usable responses

165

The sample was partitioned into these subsets to make the
analysis more useful.

Thus,

eight estimating equations

were calculated using the least squares method.

Equations

were estimated for the pooled data and each of the three
subsets in both of the models that were developed.
Statistically significant relationships were
found only in the operating income model for the m a n u 
facturing company subset indicating a positive relationship
between operating income and the ESOP for manufacturing
companies.

Further, the statistically significant variables

in this overall relationship were percentage of company c o m 
mon stock owned by the ESOP and percentage of ESOP-covered
employees who had vested interests in the plan which were
both positively correlated to the criterion variable.
The results of the study support the general e n 
couragement of ESOPs through tax policy.

The results also

indicate that ESOP policy makers should place greater
emphasis on real transfers of ownership through ESOPs
by encouraging the use of common stock and liberal
vesting schedules.

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Background
If we are ever going to curb the economic
inflation which seems to bedevil us, we
must find some way in which to encourage
each man and woman to become more pro d u c 
tive in his and her job.
Providing each
individual an ownership share in his
employer, making hi m a partner with his
employer in the profits whi c h his labor
generates, can provide us with an excel
lent step in that d i r e c t i o n . 1
The above statement was made by Senator Russell
B. Long in a Senate Finance Committee hearing on Employee
Stock Ownership Plans

(ESOPs).

The statement is repre

sentative of the sentiment toward ESOPs of many influ
ential members of the U.S.

Congress.

An ESOP is a deferred compensation program which
qualifies under the Internal Revenue Code

(IRC) to grant

tax benefits to both corporations and employees of co r 
porations.

Since 19 74 many U.S. business firms have

1U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance,
Employee Stock Ownership Plans and General Stock O w n e r 
ship T r u s t s , Hearings on S. 3241, S’! 3223 and H.R. 13 882 ,
9 5th C o n g . , 2nd S e s s . , 1978 (Washington, D.C.:
U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 58.

1

2
adopted ESOPs and the business literature has presented a
great number of articles on this subject.

The American

experience with ESOPs has raised many issues that cut
across several disciplines.

This study attempts to pr o 

vide empirical evidence which can be used by the policy
makers who will decide whether or not ESOPs are to become
an integral part of the American way of life.

ESOPs in General
ESOPs generally involve corporate contributions
to an exempt trust and subsequent distributions

from the

trust to the covered employees

Since the

(participants).

tax exempt status of the trust is critical to the success
ful operation of an ESOP, the term ESOT

(employee stock

ownership trust) is often used in reference to these plans.
In order to obtain the tax exempt status of the
trust and other tax benefits, an employee benefit plan
must be qualified under the appropriate provisions of
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 19 74
(ERISA)2 and the Internal Revenue Code
qualified,

(IRC).

To be

a plan must be established pursuant to a

written i n s t r u m e n t .

This plan document must contain

all the details of the p l a n . 3

These details must,

of

course, comply with the various provisions of ERISA and
and the IRC which apply to the type of plan involved.

2Pub.

L. No.

9 3-40 6, 88 Stat.

3ERISA section 402.

829 (1974).

3
All ESOPs, then, are generally subject to the
many restrictions contained in title I of ERISA and
subchapter D of the IRC that apply to qualified plans.
One of these restrictions prohibits a plan from holding
more than 10% of its trust assets in employer s ecurities.1*
However, ESOPs as well as profit sharing plans and money
purchase pension plans are specifically exempted from this
rest r i c t i o n . 5

Such plans are referred to as "eligible

individual account plans" in E R I S A . 6

These plans are

permitted to invest up to 100% of their trust fund assets
in employer securities.

Other restrictions which apply

to qualified plans relate to participation, vesting,
nondiversion of assets,

forfeitures,

fiduciary responsibilities.

funding,

and

A thorough discussion of

these rules is beyond the scope of this study.
As qualified plans in general and eligible indi
vidual account plans in particular, all ESOPs have the
following common characteristics:
1.

There is no mini m u m level of contributions

required.7

“ERISA section 407(a)(2).
5ERISA section 407(b)(1).
6ERISA section 407(d)(3).
7Treas. Reg,
1 . 4 0 1 - 1 (b)(2).

sections 1 . 4 0 1 - l ( b ) (1 ) (iii) and

If

2.

Corporate contributions to the trust result

in deductions or credits depending on the type of E S O P , 8
These contributions are generally in the form of employer
stock or cash to be used to acquire employer stock.
The deduction or credit, then,
#

the stock.9

is based on the value of

This aspect of ESOPs requires that closely-

held stock be valued "in good faith by the trustee or
the named f i d u c iary." 10
3.

The contributions,

even though deductible

by the corporation, are not taxed as income to the trust
or the parti c i p a n t s . 11
4.

Income earned by the trust assets is not

taxed to the trust or the p a r t i c i p a n t s . 12
5.

Distributions to the participants are gen

erally made in lump-sum form and thus qualify for favor
able tax treatment.

A distributee may elect to have

the taxable portion of a lump-sum distribution taxed
separately using a ten-year averaging formula.

Under

this- election, the taxable portion of the distribution
which applies to pre-19 7 3 participation is taxed as a
long-term capital gain unless the distributee further

8IRC section 404(a) or IRC section 46(a)(2).
9 U.S.

v. General Shoe C o r p , 282 F.2d 9(6th Cir.1960).

1°ERISA section 3(18).
11IRC sections 401(a),
12Ibid.

402(a)(1)

and 501(a).

elects to use the ten-year averaging formula for the
full a m o u n t . 13
There are, however, three distinctly different
forms of ESOPs.

This report will refer to these forms

separately as A) stock bonus plans,

B) leveraged ESOPs

and C) investment credit ESOPs.
Throughout this report the term "ESOP’' is used
in a general sense to refer to all three types of ESOPs
where no distinction is necessary.
is necessary,

Where a distinction

the above-mentioned terms will be used.

Further, the term "ESOT"

is used to refer specifically

to the trust which is a necessary part of an ESOP.
Stock Bonus Plans
The stock bonus plan
of ESOP.

(SBP) is the simplest form

SBPs are allowed a good deal of flexibility

with respect to contributions.

There are no ERISA or

Code specifications as to the form of contributions or
to the formula for determining the amount of contribu
tions.

Annual contributions are not required but contri

butions must be "recurring and s u b s t a n t i a l . " 1**

However,

the IRC does put a limit on the maxi m u m deduction which
is available for contributions to an SBP in one year.
This limit is generally 15% of covered compensation

13IRC section 402(a) and
^Treas.

Reg.

(e).

section 1.4 0 1 - l ( b ) (2).

although the limit is raised to 2 5% if the SBP is com
bined with a money purchase pension plan.

Carryforwards

are available for annual contributions less than or
greater than the 15% l i m i t . 15

Further,

the contributions

must be allocated to participant accounts according to
a "definite predetermined f o r m u l a . " 15
Flexibility is also permitted with respect to
the trust fund in v e s t m e n t s .

Although SBPs are permitted

to invest up to 100% of their trust fund assets in e m 
ployer securities,

no m i n i m u m level o f investment in

employer securities is required.

However,

SBPs are

required to make distributions only in the form of
employer s t o c k . 17

This requirement,

in effect, mandates

investment of trust assets in employer stock at some
point prior to distribution.

The SBP may acquire the

necessary employer stock from the sponsoring corporation
or from another s h a r e h o l d e r . 10

However, an SBP is pr o 

hibited from using an installment approach in acquiring
s t o c k . 19

Further,

since SBPs are qualified plans, the

15IRC sections 404(a) (3) (A) and 404(a)(7).
lGTreas.

Reg.

section 1 . 4 0 1 - 1 (b)Cl)Cii).

17Treas.

Reg.

section 1 . 401,-l(b)Cl)(iii).

lsERISA section 4-08 Ce) and IRC section 4975(d) (13).
19ERISA section 406(a)(1)(B)
4 9 7 5 ( c ) ( 1 ) (B).

and IRC section

7
the trust assets must be managed prudently for the exclusive
benefit of the participants.20
IRC Section 401(a)C22) requires SBPs holding more
than 10% of trust assets in employer securities to pa ss 
through voting rights to the participants.

If the spon

soring corporation is publicly held, complete voting
rights must be passed through.

If the sponsoring cor

poration is closely held, pass-through of voting rights
is required only with respect to corporate actions that
require the approval of more than a majority of share
holders.

However, as noted above, an SBP is not required

to invest in voting stock.
Leveraged ESOPs
A leveraged ESOP results when an ESOT obtains a
bank loan which is guaranteed by the sponsoring corpora
tion and uses the proceeds to purchase stock from the
sponsoring corporation.

As part of the loan agreement

the corporation is committed to make annual cash con
tributions to the trust sufficient to amortize the loan.
Generally, an ESOT is prohibited from obtaining a loan
that is guaranteed by the sponsoring corporation,21 and
it is unlikely that a bank would make a loan to an ESOT
absent such guarantee.

However, ERISA included an

2 “ERISA section 404(a)(1).
21 See note 19.

8

e x c e p t i o n to this p r o h i b i t i o n for l e v e r a g e d ESOPs.

This

exemption also enables a l e v e r a g e d ESOP to engage in an
installment purchase of e m p l o y e r s t o c k . 22
IRC Section 4975(e)(7)

defines a l e v e r a g e d ESOP

as a defined c o n t r ibu t i o n plan:
(A) w h i c h is a stock bonus pl a n w h i c h is
qualified, or a stock bonus pl a n and a m o n e y
purchase pl a n both of w h i c h are qual i f i e d
u n d e r section 4 0 1 ( a ) , and w h i c h are desi g n e d
to invest p r i m a r i l y in q u a l i f y i n g e m p l o y e r
securities; an d (B) w h i c h is otherwise
d e fined in regul a t i o n s p r e s c r i b e d by the
Secretary.2 3
L e v e r a g e d ESO P s are,

t herefore,

ject to the same tax rules as SBPs.
section 4975(e)(7)

generally sub

In addition,

(through IRC section 409A)

IRC

permits

leveraged ESOPs to d i s t r i b u t e cash subject to a p a r t i c i 
pant's right to demand

employer

securities.

The prop o s e d

T e chnical C o r r e c t i o n s A ct of 1979 will change the effec t i v e
date of this p rovisio n to apply to d i s t r i b u t i o n s m a d e after
December

31 , 1979. 2 4

section 409A)
grant

IRC.s e c t i o n 4975(e)(7)

(through IRC

also r e q u i r e s c l o s e l y - h e l d corpor a t i o n s to

l e veraged ESOP p a r t i c i p a n t s the r i g h t to sell any

distributed

stock back to the c o r p o r a t i o n und e r a fair

v a l u a t i o n formula.

22E R I S A section 408(b)(3)
4 9 7 5 ( d ) (3).

and IRC section

2 3A s i milar d e f i n i t i o n is c o n t a i n e d in ERISA
section 407(d)(6).
T he te r m " i n d i v i d u a l acco u n t plan"
appears in E R I S A in lieu of " d e f i n e d c o n t r i b u t i o n plan."
21,H.R. 2797 and S.
section 101(a)(5)(B).

614,

96th Cong.,

1st sess.,

9

The Technical Corrections Act of 1979 will also
conform the section 4-9 75 definition of "qualifying employer
securities" to the definition that is given to the term
"employer securities" in section 409A(1) which applies
to investment credit E S O P s . 25

The definition in section

40 9AC1) essentially limits qualifying employer securities
to common stock or preferred stock that is convertible at
a reasonable price.

Investment Credit ESOPs
Investment credit ESOPs were created as a t e m 
porary program by the Tax Reduction Act of 1 9 7 5 . 26
These plans, therefore,

are often referred to as TRASOPs.

However, the Revenue Act of 19 7 8 incorporated most of the
TRASOP provisions of the Tax Reducation Act of 19 75 into
the IRC by adding new section 409A.2 7

Although these

plans now have a 19 8 3 expiration date, they have apparently
become a permanent part of the IRC . 20

Also, these plans

are officially referred to as "ESOPs"

in the IRC as d i s 

tinguished from the term "leveraged ESOPs" which is now
the term used in IRC section 49 75.

This report uses the

term "investment credit ESOPs" to avo i d confusion.

25Proposed A c t , section 101(a)(5)(C)
2 ePub.

L. No.

94-12 , 89 Stat.

27Pub.

L. No.

95-600,

26 (1975).

section 141(a).

20IRC section 46(a)(2)(E).

10
Pursuant to an investment credit ESOP, a corpora
tion is allowed a tax credit of 1% in addition to the
regular 10% investment tax credit permitted by IRC sections
38, 46 et seq.

That is, the corporation is allowed

up to 11% of its investment in qualified property as a
credit against its tax liability instead of the regular
10%.

To obtain this additional tax credit the corporation

must t ransfer stock with an aggregate value equal to the
additional credit to an E S O T . 29

A n o t h e r credit of up to

1/2% is allowed if the corporation contributes stock equal
in value to this extra credit and the employees also co n 
tribute cash equal to this extra c r e d i t . 30

Thus,

the

additional ESOP investment tax credit can total 1 1/2%
of the investment in qualified property.
Investment credit ESOPs are generally subject to
the same rules which apply to SBPs.

In addition,

con t r i 

butions must be made in the form of "employer securities"
which,

as mentioned above, means common stock or conv e r 

tible p r e f e r r e d . 31
form of cash

However,

contributions car. be in the ■

if such cash is used to purchase employer

securities within 30
leveraged ESOPs,

days of the c o n t r i b u t i o n . 32 Like

investment credit ESOPs can distribute

2 9IRC

section 48(n)(l)(A).

30IRC

section 48(n)(l)(B).

31IRC

section 409A(1).

32IRC

section 48(n)(3).

11

cash subject to a participant's right to demand stock and,
in the case of closely-held stock,

put options must be

granted under a fair valuation f o r m u l a . 3 3
Investment credit ESOPs also have certain other
unique characteristics.

First, contributions to a plan

must be allocated to participant accounts for the plan
year the additional credit is taken in proportion to
participant compensation.

However,

compensation in

excess of $100 ,000 is d i s r e g a r d e d . 31*

Second, p a r t i c i 

pants must have nonforfeitable rights to any stock a l 
located to their a c c o u n t s . 35

Third,

allocated stock can

not be distributed for seven years except in the case of
separation from service, death, or d i s a b i l i t y . 36
Finally, a corporation may reduce its contributions to
the plan as a partial reimbursement for the costs of
establishing and administering the plan.

As reimbursement

for establishing the plan, the corporation may reduce its
contribution

(for the year of plan establishment) by the

amount of the establishment costs not to exceed the sum of
A) 10% of the first $100,000 of required contributions, and
B) 5% of required contributions

33IRC section 4-09A(h).
31*IRC section *+09A(b).
3SIRC section HQ9A(c).
3eIRC section 409A(d).
37IRC section ^ O S A C D C l )

in excess of $ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 37
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As reimbursement for annual administrative expenses, the
corporation may reduce its annual contribution by the
lesser of:
(A) the sum of
(i) 10 percent of the first $100,000 of
the dividends paid to the plan with
respect to stock of the employer during
the plan year ending with or within the
employer's taxable year, and Cii) 5 pe r 
cent of the amount of such dividends in
excess of $100,000 or
(B) $ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 38

Historical Development of ESOPs
Metzger traces the ESOP concept back to the 184-0
to 18 50 period in Germany.

Johann Heinrich Von Thunen

used the ESOP approach in his farming business.

Metzger

states that the profits of the business were reinvested
in capital assets that were titled to the workers.

He

further states that the program included the maintenance
of individual employee accounts that were credited annually
with shares of the p r o f i t . 39
Although various forms of employee participation
have been used in the U.S.

and Europe for many years, the

ESOP approach was quite limited until 19714.

In that year

Congress passed the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act.

ERISA,

sometimes referred to as the Pension Reform

38IRC section 409A(i)(2).
" S u b m i s s i o n by Bert L. Metzger, President, Profit
Sharing Research Foundation, Hearings, 197 8, p. 531.
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Act of 1974,

essentially tightened the rules for admi n i s 

tering private pension plans.
promoted ESOPs in two ways.

ERISA has apparently
First, the Act permits only

leveraged ESOPs to engage in the leveraging procedure
described above.

This provision of ERISA is generally

traced to Senator Russell Long who got the idea of
leveraged ESOPs from Louis 0. K e l s o . 1*0

Kelso is generally

considered to be the originator of the ESOP concept al 
though his theories seem to be limited to the use of
leveraged ESOPs as capital formation v e h i c l e s . 1*1

The

second way that ERISA promoted ESOPs is less direct.
ERISA contains harsh penalties for imprudent management
of pension fund assets.

Since ESOPs are permitted to

invest primarily in employer securities, d i versifica
tion of trust fund assets is not required.

ERISA,

therefore, may have encouraged ESOPs and simultaneously
discouraged traditional pension plans.

Since vast numbers

of traditional pension plans have been discontinued since
197 4, there is a possibility that ESOPs are being used
as substitutes or replacements for traditional p l a n s . 1*2

110Charles G. Burck, "There's More to ESOP than
Meets the Eye," F o r t u n e , M a r c h 1976, p. 129.
1,1See Louis 0. Kelso and Patricia Hetter, How to
Turn Eighty Million Workers into Capitalists (New York:
Random House, 19 6 71}..
1,2"One-Third of Pension Plans Die," The Morning
Advocate (Baton Rouge, LA.), 21 July 1977, p. G8.
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The Tax Reducation Act of 19 75 also promoted ESOP forma
tion.

As mentioned above, this law created the invest

ment credit ESOP,
Since 19 74 there have been several other ESOP
provisions injected into the tax law.

However,

in the

evolution of ESOPs, ERISA and the Tax Reduction Act of
19 7 5 were unquestionably the critical events.

Table 1

below illustrates the pattern of ESOP formation apparently
flowing from this legislation.
TABLE 1
PATTERN OF ESOP FORMATION

Estimated Number of
New Plans Established

Period
1955 - 1970

300

1970 - 1976

100

1976

856

1977

988

Source:

Address delivered by Robert W. Smiley, Jr. to the
first annual meeting o f the ESOP Council of
America in Los Angeles, California, May 8, 1978.

The Nee d for Research

ESOPs and Tax Policy
The above discussion indicates that ESOP formation
depends, to some extent, on tax incentives.

The subject

4

of tax incentives is controversial on two levels.

First,
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there is disagreement on whet h e r the government should
use tax incentives in general.

Second, among those who

feel that the use of tax incentives is appropriate, there
is much disagreement over which tax incentives are
justifiable.
On the first level of the t a x incentive contro
versy, there seem to be two schools of thought.

Many

tax policy commentators feel that the income ta x should
be neutral.

That is, the government should not attempt

to influence economic behavior with the use of tax de
ductions and credits.

Proponents of the neutral approach

to taxation believe that economic behavior should be in
fluenced only by free market forces.

When these forces

do not result in optimality, then other nontax fiscal
instruments or regulatory devices should be used to cor
rect the imperfection.

The other school of thought in

this controversy takes an optimization approach to tax
policy.

Proponents of this approach emphasize the dif

ficulty of achieving economic efficiency in a power-based
economy.

This group believes that the government should

use all the devices at its disposal in attempting to
correct the imperfections of the market system.

3

Tax policy with respect to ESOPs clearly falls
into the second level of the tax incentive controversy.

“ 3George F. Break and Joseph A. Peckman, Federal Tax
Reform, the Impossible D r e a m ?
(Washington, D.C.:
The
Brookings Institution, 1975 ), p. 8.
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Assuming an optimization approach to taxation, tax ben e 
fits for ESOPs should be justified economically.

Tax

benefits in the form of deductions and credits are equ i 
valent to direct government expenditures.
expenditures"

The term "tax

is generally used to describe these special

tax provisions which actually reduce tax r e v e n u e s . 44
Smith states that " . . .

the good effects of wise govern

ment expenditures should more than offset the bad effects
of the taxation which pays for the o u t l a y s . " 45

The good

effects that may result from a ta x expenditure are r e 
ferred to as "external b e n e f i t s . " 46
expenditure,

To justify a tax

then, the benefits flowing there f r o m must

reach beyond the group that receives the tax deduction
or credit.

A justifiable tax expenditure must produce

external benefits for society at large.
After the enactment of ERISA,

the ESOP concept

burst onto the American business scene as a new and power
ful tool of corporate f i n a n c e . 47

In those early ESOP days

(1975*-76) the tax incentives necessary to encourage the

44Joseph A. Peckman, Federal Tax P o l i c y , 3rd ed.
(Washington, D.C.:
The Brookings Institution, 1977), p. 25.
4SDan Throop Smith, Federal Tax Reform, the Issues
and a Program (New York:
McGraw-Hill; 1961), p. 3"!
46Robert H. Haveman, The Economics of the Public
S e c t o r , 2nd ed. (New York:
John Wiley and Sons, 19 76)
p. 33.
47See Thomas L. Dana, "Mighty Kelso, His Brain Child
is an Idea Whose Time Has Come," B a r r o n ' s , July 21, 19J5,
p. 3.
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adoption of ESOPs were related to the capital formation
problem.

That is,

leveraged ESOPs were touted as a low-

cost means for corporations to raise capital:
. . .(T)he difference between this and con
ventional finance is that when a particular
financing process is completed, the employees
have bought stock, paid for it out of what
the underlying capital produced, in pretax
dollars which accelerates the process be
cause the law permits this to be done, and
the corporation has gotten the advantage
of low-cost c a p i t a l . . ,(I)t has very
strong implications for monetary reform
and the acceleration of the ability of
the economy to raise newly formed capital—
one of the most serious problems facing
our country today (emphasis a d d e d ) . 1*0
Clearly,

capital formation is contemplated as an external

benefit by Kelso in the above quote.

Further, he a p p a r 

ently ties this result to the assumption that a leveraged
ESOP permits a corporation to raise low-cost capital.

H ow

ever, as revealed in Chapter III, this low-cost capital
assumption has not held up well under subsequent analyses.
In more recent days, ESOP advocates have emphasized
another aspect of ESOPs as justification for further tax
incentives.

ESOPs are also seen as a mechanism w h i c h can

increase corporate profits by increasing worker producti
vity.

The following quotes are descriptive of this p e r 

ceived connection between ESOPs and corporate profits:

u 8Statement by Louis 0. Kelso, Kelso and Co., U.S.
Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Employee Stock Own e r 
ship Plans ( E S O P s ) , Hearings, 9 4th C o n g . , 1st S e s s .,
1§ 7 5 (Washington, D . C . : U.S. Government Printing Office,
1976), pp. 132-135.
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. . .(I)f employees have a piece of the
action, one would expect that they would
perform more responsively and more pro
ductively. . . The employees would have
a mutual interest with the employer in
increasing the productivity and p r o f i t 
ability of the f i r m . 1*9
In terms of employee motivation, our
productivity increased very, very sub
stantially in all areas of our company
. . . From a financial point of view,
our employee stock ownership has been
a resounding success . . . We have had
3 profitable years after a series of
unsatisfactory years . . . so
(Senator Long speaking) Mr. Strickland
will you give us your thoughts about
employee motivation as it results from
employee stock ownership?
(Mr. Str i c k 
land responding) Yes, Mr. Chairman.
I
could talk for a long time about that
. . . In terms of net profit before tax,
per employee, the five leading retailers
ranged from $1,00 0 per employee to about
$3,50 0 per employee.
L o w e ’s last year
was $8,800 net profit, before tax, per
employee.
We think that speaks well for
their desire and their d r i v e . 51
The external benefits flowing from ESOP tax incentives
according to the employee motivation view of ESOPs are
related to overall industrial efficiency resulting from
increased labor productivity.

H 9 Statement by Donald Lubick, Deputy Assistant Secre
tary of the Treasury for Tax Policy, Hearings, 19 78, p. 170.
50Statement by J. R. Boulis,
South Bend Lathe Company, Hearings,

Chairman and President,
1978, pp. 94, 95.

5 S t a t e m e n t by Robert L. Strickland, Lowe's Cos.,
Inc., Hearings, 1978, p. 74.
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ESOPs and Management Policy
The theory that ESOPs motivate workers is also of
interest to corporate management.

If this theory is valid,

ESOPs would generate external benefits as explained above.
However, management is interested in the internal benefit
of increased profit.

Therefore, if ESOPs can be justified

on the basis of increased labor productivity for tax
policy,

the same justification would apply to management

policy making.

That is, any evidence which would support

ESOP formation from the standpoint of tax policy would
also support the concept of ESOP use as a management
tool.

Related Research
Very little evidence is available to support the
motivation theory of ESOPs.

Two research projects were

recently completed, however, which suggested the possi
bility of further research on this theory.

First,

Conte

and Tannenbaum studied the relationship between company
profit and certain ESOP-related v a r i a b l e s . 52

Second, a

group of M B A students at UCL A completed a survey which
gathered information from companies with E S O P s . 53

52Michael Conte and Arnold S. Tannenbaum,
Owned Companies:
Is the Difference Measurable?"
Labor R e v i e w , July 1978, pp. 23-28.

"EmployeeMonthly

S3Matthew Bonaccorsco, Sheridan Cranmer, David
Greenhut, Daphne Hoffman and Niel Isbrandtsen, "Survey of
Employee Stock Ownership Plans:
Analysis and Evaluation
of Current Experience," (Unpublished report, UCLA, 1977).
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Conte and Tannenbaum developed an econometric
model designed to explain the relationship between pre
tax profit and ESOPs.

That is, pre-tax profit was the

criterion variable and certain ESOP-related variables
were the explanatory variables in a cross-section
»

multiple linear regression model.

The data for the model

were gathered from firms with ESOPs.

The analysis re

vealed a statistically significant relationship between
pre-tax profit and the percentage of equity owned by
workers for the companies in the sample.

The sample,

however,

Robert Strauss,

included only twenty companies.

former U.S.

Special Counselor on Inflation, commented on

this study by stating that " . . .

the sample is too small

to be very defi n i t i v e . " 54
The UCLA study was nonscientific in nature.
is, no hypotheses were tested.

That

The purpose of the sur

vey was to gather descriptive information about existing
ESOPs and their sponsoring corporations.

The most sig

nificant aspect of this study was that the survey generated
186 responses

from ESOP companies.

as their data source,

The researchers used,

a mailing list of potential ESOP

companies compiled by the ESOP Council of America.
These two studies, then, are obvious complements
to each other.

Each one possesses what the other lacks.

s“Hearings, 1978, p. 165.
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The data source used by the UCLA group could be combined
with the approach used by Conte and Tanne n b a u m to produce
a study that would provide significant evidence relative
to the fundamental effects of ESOPs.

Such evidence, as

indicated above, woul d be quite useful to both tax and
management policy makers.
Scope of the Study
Obj ectives
As stated in the first section of the chapter, the
primary purpose of this study is to provide the kind of
empirical evidence described above.

The findings of the

study, then, will constitute evidence either for or
against the claims of ESOP advocates relative to the im
pact of ESOPs on company operating performance.
Methodology
The details of the research design used in the
study are contained in Chapter IV.

In general, however,

the study combines the complementary aspects of the two
studies described above.

A modified version of the

econometric model developed by Conte and Tannenbaum is
employed.

This study includes different variables and

also partitions the sample into more homogeneous subsets.
The sample consists of 16 5 companies that responded to a
questionnaire survey which employed the data source of
the UCLA study.
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The models developed in this study,

as described

in Chapter IV, are used to test the following hypotheses.
(1) There is no statistically significant
relationship between company operating
performance and the ESOP-related
variables.
(2) There is no statistically significant
relationship between company operating
performance and the percentage of a
company's stock owned b y the ESOP.
(3) There is no statistically significant
relationship between company operating
performance and the size of the con
tribution that has been made to the
ESOP.
(40 There is no statistically significant
relationship between company operating
performance and the period of time the
ESOP has been in existence.
(5) There is no statistically significant
relationship between company operating
performance and the percentage of ESOPcovered employees who have vested
interests in the ESOP.

Organization of the Study
This chapter as well as Chapters

II and III review

the ESOP literature relevant to the study.

Some of the

more important ESOP issues are examined in these c h a p t e r s .
The details of the empirical research are contained in
Chapters IV and V,

The research design and data collec

tion are described in Chapter IV.

The results of the data

analysis and hypothesis tests are presented in Chapter V.
9

Finally,

Chapter VI contains the conclusions and recom

mendations of the study.

CHAPTER II
ESOP ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL REPORTING

Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss ESOP
problems and issues relative to accounting and financial
reporting.

The impact of ESOPs on the balance sheet and

income statement is discussed in terms of financial account
ing theory and existing pronouncements.

ESOP disclosure

rules are discussed even though there are no specific p r o 
nouncements in this area.
securities

Finally, the impact of the

laws on various ESOP transactions is considered.
Balance Sheet Considerations

The ESOP Loan
The most serious issue in ESOP accounting is related
to the leveraged ESOP.

There is some controversy over

whether or not the bank loan should be reported as a liabil
ity on the balance sheet of the employer company.

If the

liability is not reported by the company, then the leveraged
ESOP can be used as a means of off-balance sheet financing.
Indeed this concept was probably the major selling point for
ESOPs after the enactment of ERISA.
23

Consider the following
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passage taken from one of the first articles to appear on
ESOPs:
The ESOT technique introduces a new strategy:
it encourages a firm to use an employee b e n e 
fit plan not only to help workers but also to
accumulate new capital.
For example, say a company needs to raise $1
million of capital.
Under conventional fi
nancing , it would borrow the money from a
bank and receive a tax deduction solely on
its interest payments, not on the principal.
Since it is re-paying the loan in after-tax
dollars, to service the $1 million debt it
must gross over $2 million.
However, under
the ESOT concept, the firm sets up an Employee
Stock Ownership Trust, and issues $1 million
worth of stock.
The trust borrows the money
from a bank (with the company acting as
g u a r a n t o r ) , buys the stock and hands over to
the company the $1 million in cash.
Since the trust carries the loan as a liabi
lity, the company has added $1 million to its
net worth, which shows up as such on the
balance s h e e t . 1
A Statement of Position

(SOP 76-3) issued by the

AICPA Accounting Standards Executive Committee recommends
that the ESOP loan be reported as a liability of the spon
soring corporation.2

The same recommendation is contained

in an SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin (SAB No.

8).3

However, theoretical arguments can be made for both
sides of this issue.

The case for not reporting the debt

xDana L. Thomas, "Mighty Kelso:
His Brainchild
is Idea Whose Time Has Come," B a r r o n ’s , July 21, 19 75, p.
2"0fficial Releases," Journal of A c c o u n t a n c y ,
March 1977, p. 10 2.
3CCH SEC Accounting Rules, par.

7001.

3.
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on the balance sheet of the employer company is based on
the definition of a liability while the opposing argument
is based on the accounting doctrine of substance over form.
These two opposing views will be evaluated in the following
paragraphs.
The ESOP debt should not be reported on the employer
f
company balance sheat.if it does not satisfy the definition
of a liability.
would,

Since the bank loan of the leveraged ESOP

in almost all cases, be guaranteed by the employer

company,

the loan could be considered to be a contingent

liability which may or may not be reported on the balance
sheet.
The most authoritative definition of a liability
is contained in APB Statement No.

4:

"Liabilities --

economic obligations of an enterprise that are recognized
and measured in conformity with generally accepted account
ing principles."^

This definition is so vague, however,

that it is of little use from a practical standpoint.
Other definitions of a liability which are con
tained in respected sources of accounting literature are
as follows:
1.

An amount . . . payable in money, or in
goods or services . , . particulary,
any debt (a) due or past due (current
liability), (b) due at a specified time

^APB Statement No. 4 . "Basic Concepts and Prin
ciples Underlying Financial Statements of Business Ent e r 
prises," (New York:
AICPA, 1970), par. 132.
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in the future (e.g., funded cost,
accrued liability), or (c) due only
on failure to perform a future act
(deferred income, contingent
l i a b i l i t y ) .5
2.

A liability is a service, valuable in
money, which a proprietor is under
existing legal (or equitable) duty to
render a second person (or set of p e r 
sons) and which is not unconditionally
an agreed set-off to its full amount
against specific services of equal or
greater money value due from this
second person to the p r o p r i e t o r . 6

3.

The interests or equities of creditors
(liabilities) are claims arising from
past activities or events which, in the
usual case, require for their satisfac
tion the expenditure of corporate
re s o u r c e s .7

The above definitions seem to provide considerable
justification for considering the ESOP to be a contingent
liability of the employer company.

Hendriksen, in d i s 

cussing the basic characteristics of l i a b i l i t i e s , provides
even more support for this approach:
The obligation must, of course, exist at the
present time.
That is, it must arise out of
some past transaction or event.
It may arise
from the acquisition of goods or s e r v i c e s ,

5Eric L. Kohler, A Dictionary for A c c o u n t a n t s ,
4th e d . , (Englewood Cliffs'] FT T7"i
Prentice Hall, I n c , ,
1970) , p.- 263 .
6John B. Canning, The Economics of A c c o u n t a n c y ,
(New York:
Ronald Press CoV”, 1'9'2'Pj"" p p . 55 - S 6.
7AAA Committee on Accou n t i n g Concepts and Standards,
Accounting and Reporting Standards for Corporate Financial
Statements and Preceding Statements'" and SupjpTements ,
(Columbus, Ohio:
AAA, 1957) , p . 77
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from losses already sustained for which the
firm is liable, or from the expectation oflosses for which the firm has obligated
itself.
Obligations contingent upon future
events should not be included unless there
is a reasonable probability that these
events will o c c u r . 0
If the bank loan of
contingent liability of

the ESOP is considered to be

a

the employer company, then the c o m 

pany would not recognize a liability and related charge u n 
less both of the following conditions are met:
a.

Information available prior to issuance
of the financial statements indicates
that it is probable that an asset has
been impaired or a liability had been
incurred at
the date of the financial
statements.
It is implicit in this
condition that it must be probable that
one or more future events will occur
confirming the fact of the loss.

b.

The amount of the loss can be reasonably
estim a t e d . 9

So long as the ESOT is financially able to meet its obliga
tions under the loan agreement, then, the employer corpora
tion would not be required to report the loan as a liabi
lity on its balance sheet.
The situation is reflexive, however,

in that the

financial capacity of the ESOT depends directly on the em 
ployer corporation itself.

Therefore, the question of

whether or not to recognize the liability would seem to

8Eldon S. Hendriksen, Accounting T h e o r y , 3rd ed.
(Homewood, 111. : Richard D. Irwin, I n c T , 19 77) , p. >+51.
9Statement of Financial Accou n t i n g Standards Mo.
"Accounting for Contingencies," (Stamford7 C o n n . : FASB,
19 75), par. 8,

5,
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relate to the financial health of the employer corporation.
If the financial viability of the corporation is in doubt
and if it appears that the corporation will not be able
to meet its obligations, the ESOT loan should be recognized
as a liability.

Otherwise, the loan should simply be d i s 

closed as a contingent liability.
The contrary position which is supported by SOP
76-3 and SAB No.

8 emphasizes the economic substance of

the arrangement rather than the legal form:
Financial accounting emphasizes the economic
substance of events even though the legal
form may differ from the economic substance
and suggest different t r e a t m e n t . 10
This view would report the ban k loan as a liability
of the corporation.

The assumption is that since there is,

in reality, no economic substance to the ESOT, the bank is
actually making the loan to the corporation.

Consider,

for example, the following quote from a Big Eight partner:
. . . its the conclusion of most accountants
that the debt, although legally one of the
trust, should be regarded in substance as
a debt of the corporation.
Therefore, the
apparent capital infusion will be treated as
debt rather than e q u i t y . 11
This view is further confirmed in a recent article
by a bank president:

1 °APB Statement No.

M-, par.

127.

11''Compensating Today's E xecutive— A Roundtable,"
The Arthur Young J o u r n a l , Winter/Spring 1976, p. 17 (Quote
by Ernest” 0. W o o d ) .
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The strength of a loan to an ESO P — ex
cepting special conditions, government
guarantees, et c . — rests on the strength
of the c o m p a n y . 12
SOP 76-3 and SAB No.

8 provide some guidance on this

issue, but their questionable authority seems to leave open
the possibility of alternative accounting approaches.
If the ESOP loan is recorded as a liability of the
corporation,

SOP 76-3 recommends that the related debit be

reported as a reduction of s t o c k h o l d e r s ’ e q u i t y . 13

APB

Opinion 25 requires the same treatment in recording the
debit relating to the issuance of compensatory stock
opt i o n s . 11*

The recognition of an asset in either case

could not be justified theoretically.
The liability could, theoretically, be reduced
either (A) as the corporation makes its obligatory c o n t r i 
butions to the ESOT or (B) as the ESOT repays the loan.

The

first approach views the liability as a debt of the corpor
ation to the ESOT.
as being,

The second approach views the bank loan

in substance, a debt of the corporation.

This

latter approach is consistent with the substance over form
view discussed above and is recommended by SOP 7 6 - 3 . 15

120. B. James, Jr., "ESOPs R e v i s i t e d — Caveat Emptor,"
The Journal of Commercial Bank L e n d i n g , January 1977, p. 25.
13SOP 76-3, par.

7.

1 ■’APB Opinion 25, "Accounting for Stock Issued to
EmployeesT11 (New York:
AICPA, 1972), par. 14-.
15S0P 76-3, par.

8.
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The related debit could also be reduced as in (A)
or (B) above.

The debit could be amortized in conjunc

tion with the reduction of the liability.

This approach

recommended by SOP 76-3, views the debit strictly as a
contra-account to the l i a b i l i t y . 16

Alternatively, the

debit could be reduced as the ESOT-held shares are al l o 
cated to participant accounts.
shares, constructively,

This approach views the

as treasury stock until they are

actually transferred to participant accounts.
Tax Allocation
Another balance sheet problem relates to the carry
forward provisions that apply to employer contributions to
an ESOP.

Where a company makes a contribution that ex 

ceeds the 15% limit prescribed in the Code, the compe n s a 
tion expense reported on the income statement will ex
ceed the deduction allowed on the tax return.

This situa

tion raises the question of interperiod tax allocation
and the deferred tax liability.
If interperiod tax allocation is applied to this
situation, the deferred tax liability wou l d be reduced
and a tax benefit wou l d be recognized.

The reason for

this result is simply that the tax provision based on
reported earnings wou l d be less than the tax liability
as determined by the tax return

16Ibid.

(assuming that there are
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no other tax/accounting differences).
hand,

If, on the other

tax allocation is not applied, then the deferred

tax liability account is not affected and the tax b e n e 
fit is not recognized.
SOP 76-3 states that the tax effects of any timing
differences should be reflected in accordance with APB
Opinion No,

11.

Paragraph 53 of that pronouncement states

that:
The conclusions of this Opinion, including
particularly the matters discussed in pa r a 
graphs 42-50 on tax deductions resulting
from operating losses, also apply to other
unused deductions and credits for tax pu r 
poses that may be carried backward or for
ward in determining taxable income (for
example, capital losses, contribution carry
overs, and foreign tax c r e d i t s ) . 17
Accordingly, paragraph 4 5 states that:
. . . the Board has concluded that the tax
benefits of loss carry forwards should not
be recognized until they are actually rea l 
ized, except in unusual circumstances when
realization is assured beyond any reasonable
doubt at the time the loss carry forwards'
a r x s e ; (emphasis in o r i g i n a l ) 1
Apparently, tax allocation should not be applied to this
situation since it would be difficult to determine that
subsequent use of the contribution carryforward would be
assured beyond any reasonable doubt.

1?APB Opinion No. 11, "Accounting for Income Taxes,"
(New York”
AIC^A, 19 67) , par. 53.
18I b i d . , par.

45.
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Income Statement Considerations

Compensation Expense
When a company makes a contribution to an ESOP it
is generally accounted for as compensation expense.

This

treatment applies whether the contribution is in cash or
in stock.

However,

if the company contributes stock, the

value of the stock must be determined.

If the stock is

closely held, valuation may be a problem.
In the case of publicly-held stock, APB Opinion
No.

2 5 states that:
. . . the unadjusted quoted market price of
a share of stock of the same class that trades
freely in an established market should be used
in measuring c o m p e n s a t i o n . 19

The Board,

prior to making the above assertion, acknowledged

the fact that the market quote is not always the best ev i 
dence

of the fair value of shares.

Nonetheless, it co n 

cluded that market quotes should be used for this purpose.
In cases where closely-held stock is contributed
to an ESOP, the valuation problem is, of course, more d i f 
ficult.

Opinion 25 provides little guidance:
If a quoted market price is unavailable, the
best
estimate of the market value of the stock
should be u s e d . 20

The best estimate for financial accounting purpo'ses, h o w 
ever, would apparently be the value which is determined for

19APB Opinion No.
2 °Ibid.

2 5 , par.

10(a).
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tax purposes.

Criteria for valuing closely-held stock are

listed in Rev.

Rul.

59-60

(1959-1 CB 237).

The above rules apply whether the company issues
new stock or treasury stock:
Measuring compensation by the cost to an
employer corporation of reacquired (treasury)
stock that is distributed through a stock
option, purchase, or award plan is not
acceptable pra c t i c e . 21
The Opinion does, however, make an exception where the
corporation:
(1) reacquires during the fiscal period for
which the stock is to be awarded and
(2) awards shortly thereafter to employees
for services during that p e r i o d . 22
If these two conditions apply, the cost of the treasury stock
may be used in determining the compensation expense.
In the case of a leveraged ESOP,

compensation expense

relevant to the plan may not be based on the contribution.
Although SOP 76-3 recommends that the cash payment to the
ESOT be allocated between compensation expense and interest
expense, another approach is theoretically conceivable.
Strauss states that a

. . more sophisticated approach

would be to measure compensation expense based on the fair
value of the shares allocated annually by the trust to the
empl o y e e s ."2 3
21Ibid., par.

11(a).

22Ibid.
23Norman N. Strauss, "Accounting Considerations," in
Employee Stock Onwership Plans:
Problems and P o t e n t i a l s ,
ed. Richard Reichler (Law Journal Press, 1978), p. 188.
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Earnings Per Share
In the
question as to

case of a leveraged ESOP, there is some
how the ESOP-acquired shares should be
*

handled for the purpose of computing earnings per share.
Hennessee and Giese suggest one approach as follows:
If the ESOP has no economic substance, and
if the ESOP debt is to be treated as a
liability of the corporation, then the
conclusion that the shares held by the
ESOP should be considered outstanding for
purposes of computing earnings per share
is materially i n c o n s i s t e n t . 2*
However, that approach would clearly violate the spirit if
not the letter of APB Opinion No.

15.

Although that Opinion

does not deal specifically with this problem, the required
treatment with respect to convertible bonds that qualify
as common stock equivalents would seem to indicate that the
shares should be considered outstanding for EPS purposes,
furthermore, both SOP 76-3 and SAB No.

8 specify that such

shares should be treated as outstanding stock for EPS p u r 
poses .

Additional Investment Tax Credit
A final income statement problem relates to the
investment credit ESOP.

Accounting for the regular invest

ment tax credit has, of course, been a controversial matter
in financial accounting theory since the early 1960's.

21*Patrick A. Hennessee and J. W. Giese, "Accounting
for Leveraged ESOPs:
Employee Benefit or Financial Tool?,"
Management A c c o u n t i n g , June 1978, p. 46.
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The debate,

for all practical purposes,

ended in 1971 when

Congress provided in Section 101(c) of the Revenue Act of
1971 that corporations could use either the "deferred
method" or the "flow-through method" of accounting for the
credit.

There is some question, however, whether this

choice would also apply to the additional credit allowed
for an ESOP.

Since the additional credit is subject to

the same IRC Sections as is the regular credit,
seemingly,
ment.

it would,

also be subject to the same accounting treat

However,

SOP 76-3 specifically states that only the

flow-through method should be used in accounting for the
additional c r e d i t . 2 5

Disclosure
There are no disclosure requirements specifically
applying to ESOPs to be found in the authoritative litera
ture.
No.

APB Opinion No.

2 5 refers to paragraph 15 of ARB

43 for disclosure requirements which apply to the com

pensation arrangements that are discussed in that O p i n i o n . 26
However,

paragraph 15 of ARB No.

43 applies to stock option

and purchase p l a n s :
In connection with financial statements, di s 
closure should be made as to the status of the
option or plan at the end of the period of r e p o r t ,
including the number of shares under option,
the option price, and the number of shares
as to which options were exercised during
the period, disclosure should be made of the

25S0P 76-3, par.
2 6APB Opinion No.

14.
25, par.

19.
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number of shares involved and the option
price t h ereof. 27
Information as to the status of the plan, number of shares
under option, and number of shares exercised might po s 
sibly be applied to ESOPs.
ever,

In the case of an ESOP, h o w 

shares contributed to the plan in current and prior

periods could be disclosed rather than shares under option
and shares exercised.
Opinion 25 also refers to Regulation S-X for other
disclosure r e q u i r e m e n t s .2 a

These disclosures which apply

to pension and retirement plans in general are as follows:
1.

A brief description of the essential
provisions of any employee pension or
retirement plan and of the accounting
and funding policies related thereto
shall be given.

2.

The estimated cost of the plan for each
period for w h i c h an income statement is
presented shall be stated.

3.

The excess, if any, of the actuarially
computed value of vested benefits over
the total of the pension fund and any
balance sheet pension accruals, less
any pension prepayments or deferred
charges, shall be given as of the most
recent practicable date.
If a plan has not been fully funded or
otherwise provided for, the estimated
amount that would be necessary to fund
or otherwise provide for the past ser
vice cost of the plan shall be disclosed

27Accounting Research Bulletin No. U 3 , "Restatement
and Revision of Accounting Research Bulletins," (New York:
AICPA, 195 3), C h . 13, par. 15
28APB Opinion No.

2 5 , par.

19.
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as of the date most recently det e r 
mined .
5.

A statement shall be given of the
nature and effect of significant
matters affecting comparability
of pension costs for any periods
for whi c h income statements are
p r e s e n t e d . 29

Of the five

requirements listed above, probably numbers

Cl)

would be the only disclosures which would

and (2)

apply to ESOPs.
APB Opinion No,

8 might represent another source

for ESOP disclosure rules.

That pronouncement lists the

following disclosure requirements for defined benefit
pension plans:
1.

A statement that such plans exist,
identifying or describing the employee
groups covered.

2.

A statement of the company's accounting
and funding policies.

3.

The provision for pension cost for the
period.

4-.

The excess, if any, of the actuarially
computed value of vested benefits over
the total of the pension fund and any
balance sheet pension accruals, less
any pension prepayments or deferred
charges,

5.

Nature and effect of significant matters
affecting comparability for all periods
presented, such as changes in accounting
methods (actuarial cost method, amortiza
tion of past and prior service cost,
treatment of actuarial gains and losses,
etc.), changes in circumstances (actuarial

29

CCH SEC Accounting Rules, par.

216
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assumptions, etc.),
ment of a p l a n . 30

or adoption or amend

These requirements are obviously similar to those listed in
Reg.

S-X and items

Cl),

(2), and (3) would seem to apply to

ESOPs.
Finally, Accounting Trends and Techniques contains
the following ESOP disclosure from the financial statements
of the Dennison Manufacturing Company:
Note H:
Employee Stock Benefit P l a n s — In
19 75 and 19 75, the company adopted an Em
ployee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) and a
Stock Savings Plan (SSP) to improve the
c o m p a n y ’s employee benefit plans by enabling
most employees to acquire shares of the com
pany' s Common Stock.
The cost of the ESOP
is borne by the company through annual con
tributions to an Employee Stock Ownership Trust in amounts determined by the Board
of Directors.
The SSP provides for employee
and company contributions up to a specified
amount.
Shares of Common Stock acquired by the plans
are to be allocated to each employee and are
held until the e m p l o y e e ’s retirement or death.
Contributions to the plans amounted to
$1,169,000 in 1976.
At December 31, 19 76, the Employee Stock O w n e r 
ship Trust was indebted to the company in the
amount of $5,027,000, which has been shown as
a deduction from shareholders' equity in the
consolidated balance sheet.
In 19 76, the
Trust acquired 242,325 shares of Common Stock
held in the treasury for $5,2 02,000, the fair market value on the date of sale.31
Based on the above information, the mini m u m financial
statement disclosure w i t h respect to an ESOP would seem to b e

3°APB Opinion No.

8 , par. 4 6.

3lAICPA, Accounting Trends and' Techniques 1977,
(New York:
AICPA, 19 7 7), p. 216.
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as follows:
1.

A description of the plan and employee
groups covered.

2.

A statement of accounting policies rele
vant to the ESOP.

3.

The value of and the number of shares
contributed to the ESOP for each period
for which an income statement is shown.

,

Securities Law
All of the major operations of an ESOP are poten
tially subject to registration with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC).

The Securities Act of 1933

and the Securities Exchange Act of 1931* require SEC regis
tration in the case of any "offer to sell," "sale" or
"delivery" of a "security."

The provisions of these Acts

may apply to the following ESOP transactions:
1.

Creating an interest in the plan for a
participant.

2.

The transfer of stock: from the sponsoring
corporation to the ESOT.

3.

The distribution of stock to a partici
pant.
The subsequent sale of ESOT-distributed
stock by a participant.

5.

The purchase by the ESOT of employee stock
from a shareholder of the sponsoring cor
poration.

SEC registration will be required for each of the
above transactions unless the transaction is not within the
scope of the Securities Acts or is subject to an exemption
contained in the Acts.

M-0
Participant Interests in the Plan
A participant's interest in the plan may be a
security under the 19 3 3 Act.

Registration of the plan

with the SEC is required unless the plan falls into one
of the three categories discussed below.
(1) A specific exemption is available in section
3(a)(2) of the 19 3 3 Ac t subject to three conditions.
the ESOP trustee must be a bank.
noncontributory.

First,

Second, the plan must be

Third, the total amount invested in

employer securities cannot exceed the total amount of
employer contributions to the ESOT.

This last condition

might be a problem for a leveraged ESOP.
(2) A compulsory ESOP may be able to avoid the
registration of participant interests by invoking the
"no sale theory."

That is, the creation of a participant

interest in an ESOP does not constitute a "sale" of a
security and is thus not within the scope of the Securities
Acts.

The no sale theory is supported in the case of a co m 

pulsory ESOP because the participant makes no investment
decision.

Also, the no sale theory has been supported by

the S E C . 32
(3) The Daniel case offers a third possibility for

32Apparel Affiliates, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter,
August 15, 19 75; Trust Mortgage Corporation, SEC No-Action
Letter, May 2, 1974; Upright, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter,
December 5, 1973; Consolidated Business Services, Inc.,
SEC No-Action Letter, December 21, 1973.
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nonregistration of participant interests in an E S O P . 33

In

this case, the Supreme Court ruled that a participant's
interest in a defined benefit pension plan was not a
security under the Securities Acts.

H o w e v e r , the decision

did not apply to contributory plans and the application of
the decision to defined contribution plans is uncertain.

Transfer of Stock From the Employer to the ESOT
The SEC staff has ruled that the no sale theory
applies to employer contributions of stock to the ESOT.

3 4

However, where the ESOT purchases stock from the employer,
the no sale theory may not apply.

In this case, two

exemptions are possible under the 1933 Act.

First, the

sale may qualify under section 4(2) as a private place
ment.

This provision requires that the purchaser of the

stock be in a position to obtain and understand any needed
information on the issuer.

Second, the sale ma y qualify

under section 3(a)C11) of the Act as an intra-state issu
ance. 3 5

To satisfy this provision the employer and the

ESOT must reside in the same state.

3 3International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America et al. v^ Daniel,
434 U. S. 1061 (1979).
3 *Harley Electronics,
June 21, 1976.
35CBT Corporation,
October 6, 19 75.

Inc.,

SEC No-Action Letter,

SEC No-Action Letter,

ESOT Distribution of Stock to a Participant
The no sale theory generally applies to ESOT di s 
tributions. 3 5

There are, however, two exceptions.

First,

the SEC staff has ruled,that a sale occurs when the p a r 
ticipant can elect to receive distributions in the form of
either cash or securit i e s . 37

Second, a sale occurs when

the distributed stock was purchased with' employee contribu
tions. 3 8

Sale of Stock by a Participant
If distributed stock has been registered with the
SEC, the participant is under no restrictions in disposing
of his shares.
tered,

However,

if the stock has not been regis

it is restricted stock under SEC rule 1 4 4 . 39

When

a participant receives restricted stock, he cannot sell it
to anyone other than the ESOT for a period of two years.
However, this holding period begins upon vesting of the
st o c k . - 0

36Monsanto Company, SEC No-Action Letter, September
27, 1974; LTV Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, A p r i l 11, 1974;
Upright, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, December 5, 1973.
37PNB Corporation,

SEC No-Action Letter, April 20,

1972.
38See note 35.
3 9 SEC Rule 144, 17 C.F.R.

230.144..

-“U n i o n a m e r i c a , Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, August 25,
1975; Snyder Crompten and Associates, SEC No-Action Letter,
July 21, 1976.
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ESOT Purchase of Stock From Employer Shareholder
Section 4(1) of the 19 33 Act contains a registra
tion exemption which would apply to shareholder sales to
an ESOT providing the shareholder is not an officer, director
or m a jor shareholder.

A shareholder sale to an ESOT might
*

also qualify as a private placement or an intrastate issue.
Otherwise registration would be required.
Summary
In terms of financial accounting, ESOPs involve
balance sheet, income statement and disclosure problems.
The balance sheet problems relate to reporting of the ESOP
loan and tax allocation.

The income statement problems

relate to measurement of compensation expense and earnings
per share and to accounting for the additional investment
tax credit.

Supplementary disclosures relevant to ESOPs

must be determined by referring to pronouncements that
pertain to other deferred compensation programs since the
ESOP-related pronouncements do not provide guidance in
this area.
In terms of securities law, all of the typical
ESOP transactions have the potential of falling under the
jurisdiction of the federal securities acts.

To avoid SEC

registration, an ESOP transaction mus t be effectively
exempted from SEC regulation by definition or specifically
exempted by statutory law.

If an exemption is not a v a i l 

able for a given ESOP transaction,
required.

SEC registration is

CHAPTER III

MANAGEMENT ASPECTS OF ESOPs

Introduction
This chapter discusses ESOPs in terms of manage
ment decision making.

First, the financial effects of

the various ESOP forms are analyzed.

Second, the pos

sible impact of an ESOP on organizational behavior is
explored.

Finally, ESOPs are compared to various al

ternative employee benefit plans.

ESOP Financial Analysis
There are many ways to analyze ESOPs in cost/
benefit terms.

ESOPs involve costs and benefits to

society in general, to the government, to corporations,
to employees, etc.

However, to evaluate ESOPs in terms

of financial management at the corporate level, the
focus must be on the existing shareholders.

That is,

the potential impact of an ESOP decision must be con
sidered in terms of the welfare of the shareholder group
in existence prior to the ESOP decision.

This approach

to corporate financial management is widely accepted as
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indicated by Weston and Brigham:

"...

the operating

goal of the firm is to maximize the value of stock
h o l d e r s ’ equity. 1,1

Financial Effects of ESOPs
The financial welfare of existing shareholders
can be affected by an ESOP's impact on a corporation's
cash flow,

earnings, net assets and shares outstanding.

To determine the potential impact of an ESOP in specific
quantitative terms, assumptions must be made about the
behavior of these variables as well as other variables
that would be affected by an ESOP decision.

Since these

assumptions would differ from firm to firm, a quantitative
analysis in numerical terms is somewhat limited.

The

literature contains many of these numerical analyses and
one of these will be referred to in the analysis below.
However, this study presents a more general analysis of
the financial effects of ESOPs which can be applied to
any ESOP decision-making situation.

The analysis shows

the effects of an ESOP on a firm's cash flow, earnings,
net assets and shares outstanding and is applied separately
to each of the three basic ESOP forms.

*J. Fred Weston and Eugene F. Brigham, Essentials
of Managerial F i n a n c e , 2nd e d . , (New York:
H o l t , Rinehart'and Winston, Inc., 1971), p. 556.
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Stock Bonus Plans
When a firm adopts a stock bonus plan,

shares of

stock are contributed to the ESOT usually on an annual
basis.

These contributions result in the following

favorable effects to the existing shareholders:
1.

Cash flow is increased by the amount of the

tax deduction which is equal to the fair market value
(FMV) of the contributed shares.
2.

The shares which are transferred to the trust

give the employees an ownership interest in the firm which
may motivate them to become more productive.

This increase

in worker productivity would increase earnings, net assets
and cash flow.
3.

The additional working capital may be reinvested

in the business and may in turn generate additional earnings
which will increase net assets and cash flow.
The adverse effects of a stock bonus plan to exist
ing shareholders are as follows:
1.

The additional compensation expense recorded

when the shares are transferred to the ESOT decreases
earnings and net assets.
2.

The increase in shares oustanding decreases

both earnings and net assets on a per share basis
3.

( dilution).

Any dividends paid on the ESOT-held shares will

decrease cash flow and net assets.
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An analysis of the financial effects of a stock
bonus plan generally leads to the conclusion reached by
Hartman et al:
There is no difference between issuing stock
to an ESOP and issuing stock to the public
while making a cash contribution to an em
ployee fund.2
However* as revealed in the above analysis, a difference
in the two alternatives may exist if the ESOP motivates
workers to become more productive.

Hartman et al acknowl

edge this possibility but they cannot include the effects
of this possibility if their numerical analysis.3
Hartman et al also point out that a stock bonus
plan can be especially useful to a closely-held corpora
tion:
Contributions to the ESOP involve no flo
tation or underwriting costs.
Thus, crea
tion of an ESOP by a small company can
enable that firm to obtain $10 0,000 for
$100,000 worth of stock."
A stock bonus plan may be financially advantageous
to a corporation if it motivates workers to become more
productive.

Further, an SBP can be a financially attractive

way for a closely-held corporation to issue additional shares
of stock.

2Bart P. Hartman, David Laxton and William Walvoord,
"A Look at Employee Stock Ownership Plans as Financing Tools,"
Management Accou n t i n g , March 197 7, p. '27.
3I bi d . , p. 28.
"Ibid.

Leveraged ESOPs
Pursuant to the adoption of a leveraged ESOP,
the ESOT obtains a bank loan, which is guaranteed by the
corporation,

and uses the proceeds to purchase stock from

the corporation.

The corporation makes subsequent cash

contributions to the ESOT which are used to repay the
loan.

The tax deductibility of these subsequent c on

tributions has misled some analysts into thinking that
this arrangement,

in effect, permits the corporation to

deduct both interest and principal portions of the loan
payments.

That is, the loan is repaid with pre-tax dollars

rather than after-tax dollars.

Consider the following

statement by Kelso:
. . . (a corporation) can borrow and then
in after-tax dollars, out of its internal
cash flow, we repay the loan . . . Through
the ESOP, the corporation can finance its
growth on pre-tax dollars.
One pre-tax
dollar does the wo r k of t w o . 5
This erroneous conclusion results from an incomplete finan
cial analysis of a leveraged ESOP.
A leveraged ESOP produces the following favorable
effects for existing shareholders:
1.

Cash flow and net assets are increased by the

amount of the loan.

5Stat'ement b y Louis 0. Kelso, Kelso and Co., U.S.
Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Employee Stock Own e r 
ship Plans (ESOPs), Hearings, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 1975
(Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975),
pp. 134-136.
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2.

Cash flow is increased by the amount of the

tax deduction resulting from the subsequent cash contri
butions .
3.

The shares transferred to the ESOT may,

as

mentioned above, result in an increase in worker p r o d u c 
tivity which would cause an increase in earnings, net
assets and cash flow.
4.

The increase in working capital from the

above effects may be reinvested in the business and may
in turn generate additional earnings whi c h will increase
net assets and cash flow.
The corresponding adverse effects are as follows:
1.

The recording of the ESOP loan on the books

of the corporation, as recommended by the AIC P A and the
SEC (see Chapter

II'.), causes net assets to be decreased

by the amount of the loan.

This liability is reduced as

the loan is repayed.
2.

The shares transferred to the ESOT decrease

both earnings and net assets on a per share basis.
3.
cash flow.

The subsequent cash contributions decrease
These contributions must also be recorded as

compensation expense

(see Chapter

II ) and thereby de

crease earnings and net assets.
The above analysis and the numerical analysis pr e 
sented by Hartman et al both lead to the following con
clusion regarding the financial impact of a leveraged ESOP:
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. . . the employee corporation could achieve
the same tax savings by borrowing directly
from the bank, repaying the loan normally,
and contributing stock equal to the value
of the principal payment to any qualified
plan.6
Kelso*s claim that a leveraged ESOP enables a com
pany to repay a loan w i t h pre-tax dollars simply does not
hold up under the above analysis.

This analysis clearly

supports the assertion made by Huene:
A company, through an ESOP, does achieve
additional tax deductions by increasing
employee compensation - pay more, deduct
more - but more tax deductions do not
necessarily save money.
Since all com
pensation programs are from pre-tax
dollars - the payments being deductible one must consider whether spending p r e 
tax dollars that might otherwise be
retained necessarily reduces cost (emphasis
in o r i g i n a l ) .7
This analysis and the numerical analysis of H a r t 
man et al reveal that leveraged ESOPs do not provide
relatively low-cost debt capital.

However,

leveraged ESOPs

can be used advantageously to achieve certain transfer-ofownership objectives.

First, a leveraged ESOP can be used

to create a market for existing shareholders

(of a closely-

held company) who wish to dispose of a portion of their
holdings.

If a shareholder sells shares back to a closely-

held corporation, the proceeds are generally taxed as
ordinary income unless the redemption includes the

6Hartman et al, Management A c c o u n t i n g , M a r c h 1977,
p.

26.

7Herbert A. Huene, "Beware the ESOP:
A Cautionary
Tale," The Tax Advisor, December 1976, p. 723.
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shareholders'

total interest in the c o m p a n y . 0

However,

a partial sell-out to an ESOT ma y qualify for capital
gain treatment.

Second, a corporation can be sold to

the employees through a leveraged ESOP.

This technique

will result in the employees assuming control of the
corporation and the previous shareholders receiving a
fair price for their shares.

Finally, a leveraged

ESOP can be used by a corporation to dispose of a
division.

The division would be transferred to a

newly formed corporation, then the shares of the ne w
corporation would be purchased by a leveraged ESOT.

Investment Credit ESOPs
The additional ESOP investment tax credit can
be taken in conjunction with an existing ESOP or a new
investment credit ESOP can be formed.

Either way, the

corporation takes the tax credit and transfers shares
of equal value to the ESOT.

The favorable effects of

this operation to the existing shareholders are as
fo l l o w s :
1.

The tax credit reduces both tax liability

and tax expense resulting in increased cash flow,

in

creased earnings and increased net assets.
2.

The transfer of shares to the ESOT ma y result

in increased worker productivity w h i c h would increase
earnings, net assets and cash flow.

3IRC section 302(c).
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3.

The additional working capital from the

above effects could be reinvested in the business and
might generate additional earnings which would increase
net assets and cash flow.
The corresponding adverse effects are as follows:
1.

The transfer of shares to the trust reduces

both earnings and net assets on a per share basis.
2.

Compensation expense is recorded when the

shares are transferred to the ESOT.
Since the increase in compensation expense is
directly offset by the reduction in tax expense, the
net result of the investment credit ESOP operation is
that the government has purchased the stock for the
employees.

Generally, this same objective could be

achieved by selling stock to the public at FMV.

How

ever, there are two important exceptions to this gen e r 
ality.

First,

the company may not be able to sell stock

to the public at FMV without incurring substantial costs
of registration and underwriting.

Second, under an

investment credit ESOP, the newly issued shares are bene
ficially owned by the employees rather than non-employee
shareholders,

and the company m ay benefit from this

employee ownership.
The Financial Decision
The analyses presented above form the framework
necessary to make a financial management decision regarding
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ESOPs.

That is, these models can be used to decide

whether an ESOP should be adopted,

continued, expanded

or used for a particular purpose.

A given firm can

use the models by developing its own figures for the
variables discussed.
The above analysis clearly reveals that, in
most ESOP decision-making situations, the critical
variables are earning power and employee motivation.
That is, an ESOP will benefit the existing shareholders
only if the firm can earn an acceptable rate of return
on additional working capital and if the ESOP moti
vates workers.

Earning power is an attribute that

depends on the overall economics of a given firm.
Employee motivation is a topic that has received c o n 
siderable attention in the management literature and
is discussed below.

ESOPs and Organizational Behavior
The previous section considered the poss i b i l 
ities of using ESOPs to achieve management goals from
a financial point of view.

This section evaluates ESOPs

from a behavioral point of view.

The importance of this

aspect of ESOPs is evident throughout this report and
the ESOP literature in general.

This section attempts

to establish a theoretical framework for the motivation
theory of ESOPs.

5 4-

Expeotancy Theory
There are several theories of motivation which
have been used to explain employee work b e h a v i o r . 9

One

which has gained much support in the recent management
literature is referred to as "expectancy the o r y . ”

Ex

pectancy theory can be used as the basis for a m o t i v 
ation theory of ESOPs.
Steers and Porter describe expectancy theory as
follows:
. . . this theory argues that m o t i v a 
tional force to perform - or effort is a multiplicative function of the
expectancies, or beliefs, that ind i 
viduals have concerning future o u t 
comes times the value they place on
those outcomes (emphasis in o r i g i n a l ) . 10
Mayes describes the theory conceptually wi t h the following
equation:
Motivation = Expectancy X V a l e n c e 11
The expectancy factor in the equation is composed of two
types of expectancies.

E + P is the expectancy that in

creased effort will lead to increased job performance.
P

'-*•

0 is the expectancy that increased job performance

will lead to a certain outcome.

Valence is the value

9Richard M. Steers and Lyman W. Porter, Motivation
and Work B e h a v i o r , (New York:
McGraw Hill, Inc., 1975),
pp. 31-218.
1°Ibi d . , p. 181.
1 ^ r o n s t o n T. Mayes, "Some Boundary Considerations
in the Application of Motivational Models," Acad e m y of
Management R e v i e w , January 1978, p. 52.
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associated with the anticipated outcome.

A more complete

equation would be:
M = CE h. p)(p -*■ 0)(V)
According to this theory,

then,

a person*s motivational

force to perform can be influenced by changing one or more
of the independent variables in the above equation.

The

expectancy variables are subjective probability estimates
ranging from 0 to +1.0.

Valence is a measure of preference

ranging from -1.0 to +1.0.

Therefore, an individual's

motivation to perform a given task will be high if his
E -*■ P and P -*■ 0 expectancies are high and if he places a
high value (V) on the anticipated outcome of his performance.
Employee Ownership and Organizational

Integration

Long studied the effects of employee ownership on
job a t t i t u d e s . 12

His theoretical model hypothesized that

employee ownership increased employee motivation by in
creasing organizational integration.

He defined organiza

tional integration as " . . . the degree to which the indi
vidual perceives that attainment of organizational goals
will result in satisfaction of his personal goals and
n e e d s . " 13

He further reasoned that employee ownership

increased integration because the major organizational

11

Richard J. Long, "The Effects of Employee O w n e r 
ship on Job Attitudes and Organizational Performance:
An
Exploratory Study," Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University,
1977.
13I b i d . , p. 12.
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goal of profit maximization is a benefit to the employees
if they are also owners.

That is, employee ownership

" . . . would strengthen the relationship between organi
zational performance and individual reward CP
*

In terms of expectancy theory,

org

->• R.
xnd

1*

integration affects

the i n d i v i d u a l ’s valence of increased organizational p e r 
formance

(por,g)*

That is, as integration increases, the

employee places a higher value on the anticipated outcome
of increased organizational performance.

Long reasons

that this increased valence of organizational performance
might motivate a workforce in two ways.

First, the in

dividual may perceive a strong relationship between his
own job effort and the performance of the organization.
That is, his E

P and P -*■ 0 expectancies m ay be high where

the outcome expected is P^
.
org

Second,

an individual

employee might perceive a relationship between P
the performance of other employees
F ..
oth

•+

P

org

.

(P^^).

o

and

Thus,

If an employee perceives that P

oth

P __.
org

he might encourage other employees to. increase their job
effort resulting in peer p r e s s u r e . 15
Long tested his the o r y on a medium-sized trucking
company which had recently been purchased by its employees.
Through a series of questionnaires and interviews he
attempted to measure changes in job attitudes resulting

1 ’’Ibid.
15I b i d , , pp.

15, 16.
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from the change to employee ownership.

His conclusion,

based on a statistical analysis of the data, was that job
satisfaction and job effort of the employees were both
■

increased.

ESOPs and Employee Ownership
Long's study argues well for the motivational im
pact of employee ownership.

However, the trucking com

pany that he studied was directly owned by the employees.
His theoretical framework and his empirical results do
not,

therefore, directly support the ESOP motivation

theory.

Additional analysis is necessary to establish

the motivational potential of an ESOP.
Although an ESOP does not result in direct employee
ownership of a firm,

its potential as an employee motivator

rests on the assumption that the ESOP participants p e r 
ceive an ownership interest flowing from the ESOP.

The

validity of this assumption is critical to the motivation
theory of ESOPs.

Therefore,

a comparison of ESOP own e r

ship to direct ownership is necessary.
When an employee directly owns shares of stock in
his employer corporation, he is truly a part owner of the
business.

As such, he possesses the various rights of

corporate stock ownership.

That is, he has the legal

right to participate in any liquidating distributions or
distributions of profit and to participate in shareholder
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voting.

He also has the right to sell his shares at his

discretion.
When an employee participates in an ESOP he is
the beneficial owner of the securities that have been
credited to his account.

Two shortcomings of ESOP

ownership may be encountered at this point.

First, the

securities credited to an e m p l o y e e ’s ESOT account may be
subject to vesting requirements.

The employee can be

certain of ultimately owning only the shares that have
vested in his account.

As Chapter I pointed out,

invest

ment credit ESOPs are required to grant immediate 100%
vesting in the plan, but other ESOPs are subject only to
the vesting requirements of ERISA.

The second limitation

of ESOP ownership relevant to the securities held in the
trust involves the type of securities credited to an
employee's account.

Although leveraged ESOPs and invest

ment credit ESOPs are no w required to hold either common
stock or convertible preferred,

stock bonus plans may hold

other types of investments

(see Chapter I).

These two

problems could, therefore,

cause an ESOP to fall substan

tially short of direct ownership as an employee motivator.
Other limitations of ESOP ownership do not appear
to be as serious as those discussed above.

Leveraged

ESOPs and investment credit ESOPs are required to pa s s 
through complete or limited voting rights to participants
at present and SBPs will be subject to this requirement
beginning in 1980

(see Chapter

I).

Dividends paid on
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stock allocated to a participant's account must either be
credited to the account or passed-through to the pa r 
ticipant.

Finally, the ESOP participant does not have

the right to dispose of the stock credited to his account.
However, this limitation should not detract from an ESOPs
potential as a motivator.

If an employee desires to sell

his ownership interest in his employer,

he apparently would

not be motivated by either direct ownership or ESOP owner
ship.
If an ESOP arrangement involves shares of common
stock that are fully or partially vested,

it should have

the same motivating effects on employees as a direct owner
ship arrangement.

That is, employees participating in an

ESOP receive the same benefit from increased P
who own shares directly.

org

as those

The wealth of an ESOP partici

pant is increased by employer profits in the same magnitude
as other shareholders.
The expectancy theory model of employee ownership
developed by Long should,

therefore,

apply to ESOPs b e 

cause the economic incentives of an ESOP are essentially
the same as those of direct ownership.

However, whether

the theory holds in practice ma y depend on how well the
details of the ESOP are communicated to the employees.
If the participants are not informed about their interests
in the plan, they cannot perceive the benefits of employee
ownership.

The assumption that employees perceive an o w n e r 

ship interest flowing from an ESOP appears to be. valid in
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theory, but in practice the assumption may depend on
effective communication.
ESOPs and Communication
Because an ESOP participant does not physically
possess any ownership shares until retirement or other
separation from service, he cannot perceive an ownership
interest flowing from the plan without some form of com
munication taking place.

He must, at a minimum, be in

formed that (A) the ESOP exists and (B) the ESOT will hold
shares of stock in his account.

ERISA contains two d i s 

closure requirements that would accomplish this minimum
level of communication.

First,

a summary plan descrip

tion must be given to any employee within ninety days
after becoming a participant in the p l a n . 16

Second, an

annual report summary, which summarises the financial
operation of the plan, must be distributed to p a r t i c i 
pants within 210 days after the close of the plan year
to which it a p p l i e s . 17

However,

effective organizational

communication beyond this minimum level could enhance the
motivational effects of an ESOP.
The expectancy theory model reveals that the m o t i 
vational potential of an ESOP depends to some extent on
the individual's P -► 0 expectancy.

This expectancy can be

enhanced by effective upward communication.

15E R ISA section lQU-(a) Cl) C C ) .
17ERISA section 10^Cb)C3).

That is,

/

61

employees will become more interested in organizational
performance if they are able to communicate their ideas
upward in the organization.

Some form of employee sug

gestion system can be used for this purpose.

Sigband

notes that:
There is value in such systems, for
millions of dollars are saved as a
result of employee suggestions.
And
the psychological value an employee
receives from participation in the
company's production procedure is
i m m e a s u r a b l e .10
Upward communication gives the employee more input into the
overall performance of the organization and thus enhances
his P

0 expectancy.
Effective downward communication can enhance the

motivational impact of an ESOP by reinforcing the implica
tions of employee ownership in the mind of the ESOP pa r
ticipant.

All three independent variables in the exp e c

tancy theory model can be influended by downward c ommunica
tion.

The individual's E

P expectancy can be increased

by communication that explains ho w he can perform his job
more efficiently.

A n E + 0 expectancy can be increased

by explaining how an employee's job affects organizational
performance.

Finally,

an employee's valence of o r g a n i z a 

tional performance can be increased by explaining how

18Norman B. Sigband, Communication for Management and
B u s i n e s s , 2nd e d . , (Glenview, 111.:
Scott, Foresman and
Company, 1976), p. 27.
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increased corporate profit benefits h i m through the ESOP,
Effective downward communication in all three of these
areas should substantially enhance the motivational p o 
tential of an ESOP.
ESOPs and Other Plans
Before deciding to adopt an ESOP, management
should consider the available alternatives.
a deferred compensation program.

As such,

compensation plan and a retirement plan.
should,

therefore,

A n ESOP is
it is both a

Management

compare ESOPs to other types of com

pensation and retirement plans.

Such comparisons are

useful even though an ESOP can be used in combination
with other plans.

Further, these comparisons should be

made from the point of view of the employee as well as
the employer.
ESOPs as a Compensation Plan
If an ESOP is viewed as additional compensation,
it should be compared to alternative nonqualified plans.
The most comparable alternative is a bonus plan which pays
the employee a periodic bonus above his base wage or
salary.

Bonuses are generally based on either organiza

tional performance or on individual p e r f o r m a n c e . 19

A

current profit sharing plan pays a periodic bonus based

19Robert E. Sibson, Compensation.
AMACOM, 1974), p. 14.

(New York:
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on periodic p r o f i t . 20

A Scanlon plan pays a monthly or

bimonthly bonus based on an individual's pr o d u c t i v i t y . 21
Both of these plans have employee motivation potential.
However,

unlike ESOPs, they are not deferred pay plans

and IRS qualification is not necessary.

Further, bonuses

are generally paid in cash although there is no reason
why a bonus could not be paid in the form of corporate
stock.

If a bonus is paid in the form of corporate stock,

the employer is allowed a t ax deduction equal to the fair
market value of the shares paid o u t . 22
Advantages of an E S O P .

For the employer,

an ESOP

offers the following advantages over a bonus plan:
1.

There is no reduction in working capital when

stock is contributed to an ESOT.

However,

a bonus paid in

the form of corporate stock would have the same effect
(i.e., a cashless tax deduction).
2.

Since employer stock is held in the employee's

ESOT account the possibility of appreciation in the value
of such stock may provide added incentive for the employee
to contribute to company profit.

A bonus paid in the form

of stock may be sold at the employee's discretion and may,

20Bert L. Metzger, Profit Sharing in P e r s p e c t i v e .
(Evanston, 111.:
Profit Sharing Research Foundation,
19610, p. 1.
21 Brian E. Moore and Timothy L. Ross, The S'ca'nlon
Way to Improved Pro d u c t i v i t y . (New York:
John Wiley and
Sons , 1978), p. JO
22IRC section 83(h).
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therefore,

not provide the added motivational impact of

employee ownership.
3.

An ESOP may reduce turnover.

An ESOP that

has vesting requirements may encourage employees to con
tinue employement because separation would result in
lost benefits.
An ESOP may permit management to maintain
greater control of corporate ownership than a current
stock bonus plan.

Pursuant to an ESOP the stock is held

by a trustee until distribution at which time it may be
reacquired by the use of a right of first refusal

in

favor of the company or the ESOT.
In comparison to a bonus plan, an ESOP will pr o
vide employees with the following advantages:
1.
savings.

An ESOP is, in effect,
That is,

a method of forced

it helps the employee provide for his

retirement.
2.

The employee acquires an ownership interest

that he would not be able to acquire with a cash bonus
unless the employer corporation is publicly owned.

How

ever, a bonus paid in the form of corporate stock could
have the same effect.
3.

Increases in the value of the stock hel d by

the ESOT can result in extraordinary employee benefit.
For example,

a warehouse laborer retired from Lowe's
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Companies, Inc. with approximately $660,0 00 in his ESOT
a c c o u n t .2 5
4.

As discussed in Chapter I, ESOT distribu

tions receive favorable tax treatment.
Disadvantages of an E S O P .

As compared to a bonus

plan, an ESOP involves the following disadvantages for
the employer:
1.

An ESOP is more complex and thus more costly

to administer.

A trustee will probably be engaged and

reports must be filed with both the IRS and the D e p a r t 
ment of

Labor.

Also,

if the

must be

valued annually, and

stock is closely held,

it

Ludwig strongly recommends

the use of a qualified appraiser of corporate s t o c k . 21*
2.

Compared to a cash bonus plan,

an ESOP

results in dilution of ownership and earnings.

Of course,

a bonus paid in stock would have the same effect.
Employees suffer the following disadvantages under
an ESOP:
1.

The employee

his ESOT account.

Since

has

no control over the stock in

he will receive the stock only

23See U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance,
Employee Stock Ownership Plans and General Stock Ownership
T r u s t s , Hearings on S. 32 41, S 3 223 and H.R. 13 88 2, 95th
Cong., 2nd Sess., 1978 (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Printing
Office, 1978), p. 81.
2wRonald L. Ludwig, "ESOP as a Financing Vehicle,"
in Employee Stock Ownership Plans:
Problems and P o t e n t i a l s ,
ed. Richard Reichler (Law J o u r n a l -P r e s s ,, 1978) , p. 36^
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upon retirement he may never benefit from it.
2.

Closely related to the first disadvantage is

the possibility of a decline in the value of the stock
in the ESOT.

The employee may actually receive less than

the amounts contributed in monetary terms or, again, po s 
sibly receive nothing at all.

ESOP as a Retirement Plan
As retirement plans ESOPs are usually compared to
deferred profit sharing plans and defined benefit pension
plans.

A deferred profit sharing plan is a qualified r e 

tirement plan as opposed to a current profit sharing plan
which is simply a type of cash bonus plan.

ESOPs and

deferred profit sharing plans are similar in that they
are both defined contribution plans as opposed to defined
benefit plans.

In a defined contribution plan the c o n 

tribution formula determines the ultimate retirement benefits
payable to the participants.

In a defined benefit plan

the benefits are predetermined and the contributions are
based on actuarial calculations that consider such factors
as funding requirements, vesting requirements and mortality
rates.
Advantages of an E S O P .

For the employer, an ESOP

offers the following advantages over the above-mentioned
qualified plans:
1.

There is no decrease in working capital when

company stock is contributed to an ESOP.
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2.
profits,

Since ESOP contributions are not based on

an operating loss can be created resulting in

an immediate tax b e n e f i t . 23
3.

Although ESOPs and profit sharing plans are

both incentive plans, ESOPs may result in added employee
motivation because they create employee ownership.
4-.

An ESOP is easier to administer than a defined

benefit plan because the ERISA diversification rule does
not apply to the trust fund assets.

However,

as explained

in Chapter I, profit sharing plans are also exempted from
this rule.
5.

Neither ESOPs nor profit sharing plans can

generate a past service liability.

Further, the amounts

contributed pursuant to an ESOP are completely flexible
subject to the maximum benefits discussed in Chapter I.
The reader should note, however, that profit sharing con
tributions are also flexible unless the plan includes a
definite contribution form u l a . 26
Compared to profit sharing and defined benefit
plans, ESOPs offer employees the following advantages:
1.

As m entioned above,

ESOPs create employee

ownership which may improve job satisfaction.

25See Hartman et al, Management A c c o u n t i n g ,
March 197 7, p. 23.
2 6Rev.

Proc.

56-22 , 1956-2 CB 1380.
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2.

Appreciation in the value of stock held in the

trust would add to the employee benefits received under
the plan.
Disadvantages of an E S O P .

In comparison to profit

sharing plans and defined benefit plans, ESOPs result in
the following disadvantages for employers:
1.

An ESOP causes dilution of ownership and ear n 

2.

Annual stock valuation is necessary for closely

ings.

held companies.
Employees suffer the following disadvantages
under an ESOP as compared to other plans:
1.

No credit is received for past service under

ESOPs or profit sharing plans.
2.

The lack of diversification in the trust fund

assets exposes the employees to increased risk.
3.

Because of the flexibility in contributions,

an ESOP may offer less security than either profit sharing
or defined benefit plans.

Combinations
Various combinations of the plans discussed above
are possible and may be desirable.

For example,

an ESOP

can be combined with profit sharing to form what Metzger
refers to as an EPSOP

(employee profit sharing and
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ownership p l a n . ) 27

This objective can be achieved either

by a profit sharing plan investing heavily in employer
stock or by basing ESOP contributions on company profits.
As another alternative, a company might use an ESOP as
a supplemental plan to a conventional defined benefit
*

plan.

Such a combination wou l d avoid several of the d i s 

advantages listed above.

However, the reader should note

that each additional plan requires additional administrative
expense.

Summary
From the perspective of corporate management,
ESOPs have financial, behavioral and other administrative
implications.

ESOP decision making requires separate

analysis in each of these manag e r i a l areas.
The financial effects of an ESOP should be an a 
lyzed in terms of the welfare of the existing stockholder
group.

Each type of ESOP will have a different financial

impact on a corporation.

A stock bonus plan is equal

financially to selling stock to the public and making cash
contributions to a qualified retirement plan unless it
motivates employees to become more productive.

A leveraged

ESOP produces financial results identical to conventional
borrowing combined with contributions of stock directly to
an ESOT.

However, a leveraged ESOP may be useful as a

transfer-of-ownership financing vehicle.

27Hearings,

197 8,, p.

538.

Finally,

an
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investment credit ESOP,

in effect,

results in a govern

ment purchase of employer stock for the employees.

The

financial effects of an investment credit ESOP, then,
are the same as selling stock to the public unless it
motivates the e m p l o y e e s .
ESOPs may affect organizational behavior by
motivating the workforce.

The motivation potential

of an ESOP can be explained by the expectancy theory
model of motivation:
Motivation = Expectancy X Valence
where expectancy generally refers to an employee's exp e c 
tations that his job performance leads to an anticipated
outcome and valence is the value associated with that o u t 
come by the employee.

A n ESOP may cause the employee

to associate increased job effort wit h increased profits
and, consequently, with increased personal reward.

Ho w 

ever, the motivation potential of an ESOP may, in practice,
depend on effective communication of the plan details to
the participants.
Before an ESOP decision is made based on the above
analyses, ESOPs should be compared to other alternative
plans.

As a compensation plan,

an ESOP should be compared

to some type of nonqualified bonus plan.

As a retirement

plan, an ESOP should be compared to a profit sharing plan
and to a defined benefit plan.

ESOPs have advantages and
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disadvantages when compared to each of these alternative
plans.

An optimal result ma y involve some combination

of these plans.

CHAPTER IV
RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA COLLECTION
Introduction
This study was carried out in two phases.

First,

an economic model was formulated to test the general h y 
potheses of the study.

Second,

a survey of ESOP companies

was conducted in order to provide the empirical data for
the model.
study.

This chapter describes these two phases of the

The first part of the chapter discusses the formu

lation of a general economic model, the general hypotheses,
and the variables of the specified model.

The second part

of the chapter discusses the survey which provided the em
pirical data for the study.

Statement of the Problem
Chapter I reviewed the development of ESOPs w i t h em
phasis on their popularity since 1974.

ESOP popularity

raised the issue of tax incentives designed to encourage
ESOP formation.

ESOP advocates contend that ESOPs increase

business productivity through increased employee mot i v a 
tion.

Chapter I also discussed the important policy im

plications related to ESOP motivation theory.
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Clearly, more evidence is needed to support this
theory.

Chapter I discussed the tax benefits of ESOP

formation to corporations and to the employees of these
corporations.

The social cost of the tax benefits was

discussed in Chapter I.

also

Is the social cost of decreased

tax revenues justified by increased business efficiency?
The purpose of this study,

as mentioned,

is to provide

evidence which can be useful to government and corporate
policy makers with respect to ESOP formation.
this study attempts to determine

Specifically,

(A) whether any relation

ship exists between company operating performance and ESOPs
and (B) the nature of any relationship which might be found
to exist.

Formulation of the Model
The stated objective of this study suggests the
following general economic model:

Y = f(E,e)
where Y = company operating performance, E = ESOP, and
e - the general disturbance or error term in the equation.
Models such as the foregoing are known as error-in-theequation models and are explained by Huang as follows:
Models that admit errors or disturbances
in their behavioral equations, in general,
are amenable to statistical test.
Now,
error in an equation arises either because
the knowledge concerning the behavior to be
modeled is imperfect (as to the functional
form and the variables to be u s e d ) , or b e 
cause practical considerations make it
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necessary -to limit attention to a
number of crucial variables . 1
An explanatory model in the above form can be
specified with company operating performance acting as
the criterion variable and certain quantifiable charac
teristics of an ESOP acting as explanatory varibles.
The General Hypotheses
The general hypotheses of the study are as fol
lows :
Cl) There is no statistically significant
relationship between company operating
performance and the ESOP-related variables.
(2) There is no statistically significant
relationship between company operating
performance and the percentage of a
company's stock owned by the ESOP.
(3) There is no statistically significant
relationship between company operating
performance and the size of the contri
bution that has been made to the ESOP.
(4) There is no statistically significant
relationship between company operating
performance and the period of time the
ESOP has been in existence.
(5) There is no statistically significant
relationship between company operating
performance and the percentage of ESOPcovered employees who have vested
interests in the ESOP.
In general, hypothesis
explanatory power of the model.

Cl) pertains to the overall
Each of the other four

1David S. Huang, Regression and Econometric
M e t h o d s , (New York:
John Wxley S^Sons, Inc., 197 0), p.

5.
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hypotheses pertains to the significance of an explanatory
variable in the model.

The Multiple Linear Regression Model
Considering the above hypotheses, the following
theoretical model can be specified:

y = e 0 + 3 iXi + $ 2x 2 + e 3x 3 +

+ e

where:
Y

= company operating performance
= the true coefficients of the model

e

= the error term in the model

Xi

= percentage of company stock owned

by the ESOP

X2

= size (as a percentage of payroll)
year contribution to the ESOP

of the prior

X 3 = period of time the ESOP has been in existence
Xtt = percentage of ESOP-covered employees who have
vested interests in the plan
These specifications represent a linear explanatory model
designed to estimate the relationships among the variables
of interest in the study.
The above model was estimated by the statistical
method of least squares using the survey data collected
by the questionnaires.

The least squares method was

executed b y a computer using the m a t r i x inversion t e c h 
nique which is part of the SPSS system of p r o g r a m s . 2

2Norman H. Nie, C. Hadlai Hull, Jean G. Jenkins,
Karin S t e i n b r e n n e r , and Dale H. Bent, Statistical Package
for the Social S c i e n c e s , 2nd ed. (New Y o r k : McGraw-Hill "
Book C o . , Inc., 1975), pp. 320-67.
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The basic behavior unit for the model is the firm
that has an ESOP.

The survey data were collected from a

sample of firms and the data represent activity in the
year of 1977.

Klein describes this approach to eco n o 

metrics as follows:
A group of business accounting statements,
covering a given period of operations, would
also form a cross-section sample from which
to estimate business patterns of behavior
on the basis of inter-firm v a r i a t i o n s . 3
The-first hypothesis was tested by a test of si g 
nificance- on R 2 .
Ho:

In this test the null hypothesis is

R 2 = 0 against the alternate H :
d

R2

i

0.

The other

four hypotheses were tested by performing one-tailed t
tests on the values and the signs of the coefficients
which were estimated by the regression method.

The null

hypothesis for a one-tailed t test on a coefficient in a
regression equation is H 0 :
thesis is either H :

B.

cL

= 0.

> 0 or H :

JC

3.

The alternate h y p o 
B.

< 0 depending on

X

the theory underlying the explanatory variable X^. ‘f
The Criterion Variables
As discussed above,

company operating performance

is the criterion variable in the model which has been f o r 
mulated.

For the purpose of this study,

operating

3Lawrence R. Klein, An Introduction to Econom e t r i c s , (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
P r e n t i c e - H a l l , Inc.,
1962), p. 5.
^See James L. Murphy, Introductory E c o n o m e t r i c s ,
(Homewood, 111.:
Richard D, I r w i n , I n c . , 19 73),
pp. 205-14.
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performance is defined as profitability.

Further, two

measures of company profit ware used in the study bot h
of which were normalized for interfirm and interindustry
comparisons.
As discussed in Chapter I, Conte and Tannenbaum
used a regression model similar to the one which is for
mulated a b o v e .5

The criterion variable in that model was

the ratio of pretax net income to sales divided by the
like ratio for the industry to which the firm belongs.
The present study employed a similar criterion variable
except that it is composed of operating income with
depreciation added bac k . s

The advantage of this variable

is that it does not contain the effects of depreciation,
interest, other nonoperating income items, extraordinary
items, or taxes which are all extraneous variables in
this study.

This method of measuring profitability also

controls many extraneous variables of a macroeconomic
and microeconomic nature.

For example, if a company is

benefiting from a general expansion in the U.S.

economy,

then most other firms in that industry are likewise

sMichael Conte and Arnold S. Tannenbaum, "Em
ployee-Owned Companies:
Is the Difference Measurable?,"
Monthly Labor R e v i e w , July 1978, pp. 23-28.
5Industry data were taken from the following
sources:
A n a l y s t rs H a n d b o o k , (New York:
Standard S Poor's
C o r p . , 1977); Moody's Bank and Finance M a n u a l , Vol 1,
(New York:
Moody's Investors Services, Inc. , 1978 ); RMA
Annual Statement S t u d i e s , (Philadelphia:
Robert Morris
Assoc i a t e s , 19 77); The Value Line Investment Sur v e y , (New
York:
A. Bernhard 6 Co., loose-leaf service).
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benefiting.

Alternatively,

if a company is suffering

from cost increases brought on by a shortage of a key
raw material, then, again, most other firms in that
industry are likewise suffering.
A second criterion variable (after-tax net
income divided by sales) was also used in this study.
After-tax income was used in this criterion variable
to evaluate the relationship between company profi
tability and the ESOP on an after-tax basis.

This

analysis focuses on the tax benefit which is received
by the ESOP company.
These two criterion variables were used to form
two separate models.

That is, two separate models were

formed when each criterion variable was regressed against
the common set of explanatory variables developed above.
Comparing the coefficients of these two models may add
insight to the analysis.

The relationships contained

in the operating income model should reflect the indirect
benefits of increased employee productivity and increased
working capital provided by the ESOP.

These rela t i o n 

ships were likewise present in the net income model.
However,

the direct tax benefit is also contained in

the net income model.

Therefore,

if the statistical

tests indicate stronger relationships in the net income
model, the analysis would suggest that companies tend to
benefit more from the ESOP tax deduction than from the
other indirect effects.

The Explanatory Variables
The explanatory variables in the model relate to
hypotheses

(2) through (5).

These variables represent

certain quantifiable characteristics of an ESOP and are
explained in the following paragraphs.
•

Percentage of company stock owned by the ESOP
(Xi).

This variable measures the proportion of company

ownership held by the employees through the ESOP.

In

creased employee ownership of a company should result
in increased employee awareness of company profit.

The

e m p l o y e e s ' ownership interest in the company becomes more
valuable as company profit increases.

Therefore, the

coefficient of this variable should be positive indicat
ing a positive relationship between company profit and
employee ownership.
Xi

is H 0 :

The null hypothesis with respect to

Bi = 0 against the alternate H :
cl

Bi > 0.

Size (as a percentage of payroll) of the prior
year contribution to the ESOP

(X2 ) .

This variable

measures the size of the most recent benefit received by
the employees as a result of the ESOP.

X 2 focuses on the

magnitude of the benefit that is received by an individual
employee.
and N.

Consider, for example, two ESOP companies M

Company M makes a contribution equal to 15% of

its covered payroll.

Company N, on the other hand,

makes a contribution equal to 5% of its covered payroll.
Clearly, the employees of M have received the larger
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benefit.

Now assume further that immediately after these

two contributions are made, M is 10% ESOP-owned and N is
50% ESOP-owned.

The employees of N clearly have a larger

ownership interest

CXi) in their company.

This example

illustrates that Xi and X 2 measure very different charac
teristics of an ESOP.
The reason for using the prior year contribution
is that ESOP contributions are generally made at the end
of a fiscal year.

Thus during 1977 the employees of an

ESOP company are aware of the 19 7 6 contribution.

They

will not be aware of the 19 7 7 contribution until it is
made probably early in 197 8 .

As mentioned, the income

statement data collected in the survey reflect 197 7
activity.

Therefore, X 2 reflects 1976 ESOP contributions.

Theoretically,

larger ESOP contributions should

result in increased employee morale.

Since increased

employee morale could logically be expected to result in
better employee performance and increased company p r o f i t s ,
the coefficient of X 2 should be positive.
thesis with respect to X 2 is H o :
alternate H :
a

The null h y p o 

B 2 = 0 against the

B 2 > 0.

Period of time the ESOP has been in existence.
This variable measures the period of time from inception
of the ESOP to the date of the company's 1977 financial
statements.

There are two theories in the ESOP field

regarding this variable.

( X3 ) .
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The first theory states that employee motivation
is increased when an ESOP is formed and then diminishes
over time.

The logic that supports this theory is that

the formation of an ESOP is accompanied by a good deal
of publicity.

However, after the ESOP is in place,

the publicity disappears.

Therefore, the employees are

aware of the ESOP when it is formed but the awareness
gradually diminishes with the passage of time from that
point.

Based on this theory, the null hypothesis with

respect to X 3 is H 0:
H GL
_:

B 3 < 0.

B 3 = 0 against the alternate

That is, an inverse relation relation-

ship is expected between company profit and the period
of time the ESOP has been in existence.
The second theory states that employee motiva
tion is affected very little at the inception of an ESOP
but is gradually increased with the passage of time from
that point.

The employees do not at first perceive the

ESOP as a significant benefit; however, as time passes,
two things happen which tend to change this perception.
First, an employee becomes increasingly aware that com
pany shares are being credited to his ESOP account.
Second, he observes the actual distribution of shares
to retiring and other terminating employees.

The result

of this changing perception is that the motivational
impact of an ESOP increases over time from its inception.
Therefore, the expectation is for a positive relation
ship between company profit and the period of time the
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ESOP has been in existence.
the null hypothesis

Based on this theory, then,

with respect

and the alternate H :
cL

to X 3 is H 0 :B 3 = 0

B 3 > 0.

Percentage of ESOP-covered employees who have
* vested interests in the plan
the proportion

(Xtt).

This variable measures

of ESOP participants who have earned the

irrevocable right to receive some or all of the company
shares that have been credited to the i r ESOP accounts.
Theoretically,

an ESOP participant does not perceive

the ESOP as a significant benefit, unless he actually
has a vested interest in the plan.

Without a vested

interest in the plan a participant cannot be certain that
he will ever receive any benefits from the plan.

Thus,

the expectation is for a positive relationship between
company profit and the percentage of ESOP-covered employees
who have vested interests
thesis with respect
nate H

cl

:

in the

to Xi, is H 0 :

plan.

The null h y p o 

Bt* = 0 and the alter

> 0.

Subset Analysis
The sample companies wer e grouped into somewhat
homogeneous subsets to make the analysis more meaningful.
The 1972 edition of the Standard Industrial C lassifica
tion M a n u a l organizes U.S. business firms into eleven
categories,

CA) through

(K).

By eliminating and com

bining categories the sample companies were grouped
into the subsets appearing in Table 2.
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TABLE 2
SAMPLE SUBSETS

Subset Designation

SIC Categories

Manufacturing Group

(C),

CD)

Trading Group

(F ) ,

(G)

Service Group

(E),

(H),

(I)

As noted in the following chapter, eight regression
equations were computed.

A n equation was computed for

each subset and for the whole sample

(pooled data)

in

each of the two regression models described above.

Survey of ESOP Companies
The data for the study were collected by sending
a questionnaire to companies that have been identified as
potential ESOP companies by the ESOP Council of America.
This mailing list was also used as the data source for
the UCLA study discussed in Chapter I.

The Questionnaire Mailing
The questionnaire which appears in the Appendix
was mailed to 1136 companies on June 16, 1378.
mailing occurred on July 28, 19 78.

A follow-up

Further, forty-four

companies selected randomly from the mailing list were
contacted by telephone during the m o n t h of October 1978.
The results of the survey are presented in Table 3.
Since some of the companies on the ESOP Council mailing
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list are not ESOP companies, the response rate on the
mailing must be estimated.

As indicated in the table,

the UCLA study contained an estimate of 85 0 ESOP c om
panies on the mailing l i s t . 7

However,

fifteen of the

forty-four companies contacted by telephone,
that they do not have ESOPs.

This proportion

indicated
(15/44)

is used to arrive at the estimate of 7 50 ESOP companies.
The difference between the two estimates may be at least
partially accounted for by companies that have discon
tinued their ESOPs.
panies

In the telephone survey,

(of the fifteen without ESOPs)

they had discontinued their ESOPs.

six c om

indicated that

The UCLA study pre

ceded the present study by approximately one year.
As shown in Table 3, 165 of the 207 questionnaires
returned were usable.

Based on the above estimates, the

usable questionnaires represent a response rate in the
area of 20%.

Mo s t of the questionnaires that were not

usable failed to provide profit information.

Since most

of the companies surveyed are closely-held corporations,
the refusal to provide profit information is not surprising.
Further,

the 16 5 usable responses were distributed among

the subsets as follows:

7Matthew Bonaccorsco, Sheridan Cranmer, David
Greenhut, Daphne Hoffman, and Niel Isbrandtsen, “Survey
of Employee Stock Ownership Plans:
Analysis and Evalu
ation of Current E x p e r i e n c e ,“ (Unpublished report, UCLA,
1977), p. 4.
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Manufacturing group

80

Trading group

40

Service group

'45

Total usable responses

165

TABLE 3
QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY RESPONSE

Questionnaires
Total mailed

Estimated
Response Rate

113 6

Estimated number of
ESOP companies on
mailing list

7 50*

850**

Total returned

207

27, 6 %

24.3%

Total usable

165

2 2 .0 %

19.4%

Returned too late

2

*Based on telephone survey
**Based on UCLA estimate
Test for Nonresponse Bias
Although a 2 0% response rate is not abnormal for
a survey like the one described above,

the problem of

nonresponse bias in the sample must be considered.

That

is, the sample may be biased if there are differences
between those companies that responded to the survey and
those that did not.

Oppenheim found that late respondents

to a mail survey are similar to nonrespondents and su g 
gested that nonresponse bias may be detected by comparing
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early returns to late retu r n s . 8

This approach to the

problem of nonresponse bias is referred to in the sur
vey literature as extrapolation.

Armstrong and Overton

tested for the effectiveness of extrapolation in esti
mating nonresponse bias and found it to be 80% accurate . 9
To test for nonresponse bias in this survey the
first thirty questionnaires received were compared to
the last thirty questionnaires received.

The t test of

significant difference between sample means was-used to
determine whether these two groups of questionnaires
were from different populations.
for the t test is H o :
H :
cL

pi

i

pa-

The null hypothesis

Pi = P 2 against the alternate

A two-tailed test is used with a = .10.

The significance level is set at

.10 because the risk

of a type II error is critical in this test.

A type II

error is the acceptance of H 0 when it is false.
Table 4- presents the results of the t tests for
all of the variables used in the models.

The calculated

t values indicate that the null hypothesis could not be
rejected for any variable.

By referring to Appendix C

of Murphy the critical t value for a = .10 and 58
(30 + 3 0 - 2) degrees of freedom can be stated as

8A.N. Oppenheim, Questionnaire Design and Attitude
Measurement, (New York:
Basic Books, I n c . , 1 9 6 6 ) , p. 34-.
9J.,Scott Armstrong, and Terry S. Overton,
"Estimating Nonresponse Bias in Mail Surveys," Journal
of Marketing Research, Vol. XIV (August 1977), pT 399.
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1.671 < t < 1 , 6 8 4 . 10

The test, therefore, gives no

evidence of nonresponse bias.
TABLE 4
TEST FOR NONRESPONSE BIAS

Mean Values
Early
Responses

Variables

Late
Responses

t Values

Operating income ratio

1. 155

.949

1 .020

Net income ratio

1.545

1.582

1.131

18.787

21.027

1.131

8 .860

11.397

1.204

Period of time the ESOP
has been in existence

33.533

34.567

1.104

Percentage of ESOPcovered employees who
have vested interests
in the plan

55.567

66.600

1. 054

Percentage of company
stock owned by the ESOP
Size (as a percentage
of payroll) of the
prior year contribu
tion to the ESOP

Questionnaire Validity and Reliability
A questionnaire such as the onei used in this study
is a measuring instrument.

As such, the problems of

validity and reliability must be considered.

These problems

are concisely described by Ary et al as follows:

1 “Murphy,

Introductory Econometrics,

p.

501.
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Validity refers to the extent to which an
instrument measures what it is supposed to
measure.
Reliability, on the other hand,
is the extent to which a measuring device
is consistent in measuring whatever it
m e a s u r e s . 11
In evaluating the seriousness of these two problems to a
research project one must consider the nature of the data
being collected.

T h e dat a collect a d in t h e survey d i s 

cussed above are enumerative.

That is, the subjects were

asked to provide numerical information from their records.
This type of survey is analogous to a survey requesting
individuals to give their ages.
Validity is not a serious problem where en u 
merative data are involved.

For example, consider again

a questionnaire that requests an individual to give his
age.

Most reasonable people would accept the number of

years from date of birth to present as being a valid
measure of age.

On the other hand, a questionnaire that

seeks to measure the native intelligence of an individual
has serious problems of validity.

T h e meas u r e s generated

by such an instrument would be seriously challenged as
being valid measures of native intelligence.

Kerlinger

concurs with this view that validity is not a serious
problem in certain kinds of research projects:
When measuring certain physical properties
and relatively simple attributes of persons,

11Donald Ary, L.C. Jacobs, and A. Razaviek, Intro
duction to Research in E d u c a t i o n , (New York:
Holt Ri n e 
hart and Winston, I n c .,_19 7 2), p . 190.
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validity is no great problem.
There
is-often rather direct and close con
gruence between the nature of the
object measured and the measuring
i nstrument . 12
The data collected in this study appear to be in the
category of "relatively simple attributes."

The ques

tionnaire, which is reproduced in the Appendix,

requested

the subject firms to provide the information needed for
the five variables discussed above.

This information

was taken directly from business records and required no
processing by the respondent.

Therefore, the data co l 

lected by the questionnaire w e r e accepted as valid
measures of the variables involved in the study and none
of the generally accepted tests

for validity were co n 

sidered necessary or appropriate.
Reliability, on the other hand,

is a serious con

sideration in any data gathering effort.

Kerlinger e x 

plains that reliability is simply a question of accuracy:
"Are the measures obtained from a measuring instrument
the true'measures of the property m e a s u r e d ? " 13

Checking

the reliability of a questionnaire can be a difficult if
not impossible task.

Again, the best approach depends on

the nature of the data that are collected.

A method

referred to in the survey literature as the "record check"

12Fred N. Kerlinger, Foundations of Behavioral
R e s e a r c h , 2nd e d . , (New York!
H o l t ,Rinehart and Winston,
I n c . , 19 73), p. 455.
13Ibid., p.

443.
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seems to be the most appropriate way of testing the
reliability of the questionnaire used in this study. 1,1
This method simply involves the checking of information
on a completed questionnaire against a published record.
Although most of the corporations in the present survey
are closely held and many did not identify themselves,
seven questionnaires were identified as coming from
publicly-held companies.

The financial data from these

questionnaires we r e checked against the information' in
Standard and Poors Corporate Records and only rounding
differences were detected.

This test is admittedly

quite limited in scope and the results must be taken
cautiously, nonetheless,

some evidence of reliability

is provided.

Limitations of the Study
This s.tudy falls into the category of ex post
facto research.

That is, the analysis is based on non-

experimental observations.

Kerlinger acknowledges that

ex post facto research suffers generally from a lack of
experimental control but he defends it as follows:
It can even be said that ex post facto
research is more important than experi
mental research.
This is, of course,
not a methodological observation.
It
means, rather, that the most important
social scientific and educational

ltfPauline V. Young, Scientific Social Surveys and
R e s e a r c h , 4th e d . , (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall,
I n c . , 1966), p. 207.
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research problems do not lend themselves
to experimentation, although many of them
do lend themselves to controlled inquiry
of the ex post facto k i n d . 1s
He also offers a piece of advice that would apply to the
reader of this report:
. . .. always treat the results and inter
pretations of the data of ex post facto
investigations with great care and c au
tion.
Where one mus t be careful with
experimental results and interpretations,
one must be doubly careful with ex post
facto results and in t e r p r e t a t i o n s . 16
Along with these general thoughts expressed by Kerlinger,
the reader should also consider the following specific
limitations of this study.
The Sample
The sample data were gathered from the question
naires returned in the survey.

This sampling method

limits the study in two respects.

First, the popul

ation from w h ich the sample was selected must be limited
to those firms known to have ESOPs.

Firms which have

ESOPs but have not been identified by the ESOP Council
of America are thus not included in the population.
wise,

Lik e 

firms which have not formed ESOPs are not included

in the population.

The second limitation resulting from

the sampling method is caused by the non-respondents to

15 Kerlinger,

p.

392.
1sIbid.

Foundations of Behavioral Research,
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to the survey.

The response rate,

as noted, was low.

The possibility of nonresponse bias must be considered
even though the results of the

nonresponse bias test

yield no evidence of such a problem.
Because of these limitations the representativeness of the sample data may be questioned.

Certainly

one cannot assert that the sample is representative of
all business firms in the U. S.

However, the sample

should be representative of those firms that have formed
ESOPs.

The ESOP Council of America mailing list is thought

to be a fairly complete list of all companies that had
formed ESOPs in time to provide the kind of information
needed for this study.

Assuming that the sample contains

no significant nonresponse bias, then, it should be
representative of those firms that have actually formed
ESOPs.
Causality
The study was associative in nature.

That is, the

regression method associates variation in profit with var
iation in the ESOP-related variables.

If these rela t i o n 

ships are found to have statistical significance,
reader should note that correlation —

the

not causation —

has been shown.
The presence of statistically significant relation
ships in the analysis could, of course, be indicative of
causality.

That is, the relationships may result because

ESOPs cause companies to be more profitable.

However,
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one must recognize other possible explanations.

For

example, there is the possibility that companies whi c h
are more profitable are more likely to form ESOPs.
This study, then, cannot prove causality.
limitation, however,
icance of the study.

This

should not detract from the signif
This assertion finds support

throughout the research literature.

The following quote

from Kerlinger is representative of this view of ca u 
sality in scientific research:
The position taken in this book is that
the study of cause and causation is an
endless maze.
One of the difficulties
is that the wo r d "cause" has surplus
meaning and metaphysical overtones.
Perhaps more important, it is not
really needed.
Scientific research can
be done without invoking cause and causal
explanations, even thou g h the words that
imply cause are almost impossible to
avoid and will occasionally be u s e d . 17

Summary
Because of the recent popularity of ESOPs and
because this popularity is tied to tax incentives, the
basic macroeconomic cost-benefit issue has been raised.
In order to provide economic and corporate policy makers
with evidence relative to this issue the study attempts
to determine

CA) whether any relationship exists between

company operating performance and ESOPs and (B) the nature
of any relationship w h i c h might be found to exist.

17I b i d . , p. 393.
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Using the meth o d of multiple linear regression the
following model was estimated:
Y = (3q + BiXj

+ 62^2

"*■ S 3X 3 +

+ s

where Y is a measure of company operating performance and
the

are ESOP-related variables.

The general h y p o 

theses of the study were tested by statistically testing
the following null hypotheses relative to this model:

H 0:

R2 = Q

H 0:

= 0.

Eight estimating equations were developed by using
two different measures of company operating performance
and by dividing the sample data into three separate sub
sets.

Normalized versions of operating income and net

income were used as different measures of company o p e r a 
ting performance.

The sample data were divided into m a n u 

facturing, trading,

and service company subsets.

A questionnaire was mai l e d to 113 6 potential ESOP
companies.

A total of 20 7 questionnaires were returned,

16 5 of which were usable.

The usable responses constitute

a response rate of approximately 2 0 % since the number of
actual ESOP companies on the mailing list is estimated to
be between 750 and 850.
The overall soundness of the data was tested in
two ways.

First,

in a test for nonresponse bias, thirty

early responses were statistically compared to thirty
late responses.

The test gave no evidence of nonresponse

bias.

Second,

in a test for reliability,

financial data

from seven questionnaires returned by publicly-held
corporations were checked against information contained
in Standard and Poors Corporation Records and only rounding
differences were detected.

CHAPTER V

DATA ANALYSIS AND TESTS OF THE HYPOTHESES
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter
results

of the

is to present the

statistical analysis of the

data.

As

discussed in the preceding chapter, the linear regres
sion model which is employed in this study is
y = Bo
where Y

can be

+ 5 i X l + e 2x 2 + e 3x 3 + e^x*

+ e

either the operating income ratio or the

net income ratio.

The two criterion variables,

then,

form two separate models when each is regressed against
the common set of explanators X^.
These two models were tested in three phases.
First,

a test was performed to determine whether the sam

ple data should be pooled or disaggregated in the m o d e l s .
Second, the general hypotheses of the study were tested
in conformity with the results of the first test.
Finally, appropriate tests were performed relative to the
underlying assumptions of the general multiple linear
regression model.
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Subset Analysis
The data were statistically analyzed to determine
whether the hypothesized relationships are significantly
different among the subsets which were described in the
previous chapter.
purpose.

The Chow test was employed for this

This test is described by Mur p h y as ".

. .a

test of equality between coefficients in two identical
models based on two different data s e t s . " 1
To perform the Chow test separate regression
equations were calculated for the subsets and the pooled
data.

The test indicates whether there are significant

differences among the coefficients

of the subsets.

If there are no significant differences the data should
be pooled and no separate analysis should be made of the
subsets.

That is, no differences would exist in the

hypothesized relationships among the subsets.
In this test the null hypothesis is Ho:
^T =

=

where r refers to the matrix of coefficients

of the explanatory variables

in a multiple

regression model and the subscripts M, T, S refer to the
manufacturing, trading and service company subsets.
alternative hypothesis is:

Ha :

i

i

The

Tg.

The results of the Chow test are presented in
Table 5.

In general, the test compares the residual sum

Barnes L. Murphy, Introductory E c o n o m e t r i c s ,
(Homewood, Illinois:
Richard"D'. Irwin, Inc. , 1973),
p. 237.
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TABLE 5
CHOW TEST RESULTS

Degrees
of
Freedom

Sum
of
Squares

Pooled Residual

160

18 6.4-5 7

Sum of Individual

150

157.167

1.0478

10

29.290

2.9290

Pooled Residual

160

48 9. 3 4-2

Sum of Individual

150

469.453

3.1297

10

19.8 89

1.9889

Mean
Squares

F Ratio

Operating Income Model

Difference

2. 795

Net Income Model

Difference

F C . 0 1 S 10/150)

= 2,44

.635
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of squares from the pooled least squares regression to
the total of the residual sums of squares fro m the separ
ate subset least squares regressions.

Mean squares are

calculated for the individual subset residuals and for
the difference between the two sum of squares amounts.
An F ratio is then formed from these two mean squares.
Table 5 reflects the F ratios for both sets of regr e s 
sion equations.

As discussed in the preceding chapter,

the first model employs the operating income ratio as
the criterion variable whereas the second model employs
the net income ratio as the criterion variable.

From

Appendix D of Murphy the critical value of F for 10 and
ISO degrees of freedom at the

.01 level of significance

is 2 .1J-U.2
The null hypothesis of the test was rejected for
the operating income model but not for the net income
model.

The Chow test results indicate that the data should

be disaggregated in the analysis of the operating income
model while pooling of the data would be appropriate for
analysis of the net income model.

Tests of the General Hypotheses

Overall Significance of the Models
The first general hypothesis tested was:
Cl) There is no statistically significant
relationship between company operating

2Ibid, p.

205.

10 0
performance and the ESOP-related
variables.
H 0 : R 2 = 0.
This hypothesis focuses on the overall explanatory power
of the multiple regression models that have been developed.
The overall significance of a multiple regres
sion model can be measured by the multiple coefficent of
determination R 2 .

From M u r p h y ,

R 2y 23 = Variation of Y explained by X 2 and X 3
Total variation of Y
in the case of a model with two explanators X 2 and X 3 . 3
Of course,

a high R 2 is indicative of a highly significant

model.
As explained by Murphy, R 2 can be tested for
statistical s i g n i f i c a n c e .**
test is H □:

R 2 = 0.

The null hypothesis for the

The test statistic is given by

Murphy as:

F

= mean square explained

CK-1, T-K)

mean square residual

where K is the number of parameters in the regression
equation and T is the number of o b s e r v a t i o n s . 3
Table 6 presents the results of the R 2 signifi
cance tests for all equations in both m o d e l s .

The null h y 

pothesis was rejected in the operating income model for the

3 Ibid. , p.

1<46.

‘‘Ibid. , p.

205 .

5Ibid . , p.

208 .
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pooled data and for the manufacturing group bot h at the
.019 level of significance.

The Chow test, however,

indicated that pooling the data in this model was not
appropriate.

On the other hand, the null hypothesis

cannot be rejected at any reasonable significance level
in the net income model.

TABLE 6
OVERALL SIGNIFICANCE OF REGRESSION EQUATIONS

Rz

F Value

F Value
Significance
Level

Operating Income Model
Pooled Data (N = 16 5)

.0708

3. 01+8

.019

Manufacturing Group
CN = 80)

. m i

3.156

.019

Trading Group

CN = 40)

.I486

1.527

.216

Service Group CN = 45)

.0490

.516

.725

Net Income Model
Pooled Data

CN =

165)

Manufacturing Group
C N = 80)

. 0363

1.509

.202

.0675

1. 357

.257

Trading Group

CN

= 40)

.0756

.535

.711

Service Group

CN

S 45)

.0554

.587

.674
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The R 2 significance tests were consistent with
the Chow test.

In the operating income model the m a n u 

facturing group R 2 was statistically significant while
the R 2 statistics of the other two groups were not
statistically different from zero.

In the net income

model none of the R 2 statistics were significant.

Significance of the Individual Coefficients
The hypotheses tested in this section were:
(2) There is no statistically significant
relationship between company operating
performance and the percentage of a com
pany's stock owned by the ESOP.
Hq : Bi = 0 .
(3) There is no statistically significant
relationship between company operating
performance and the size of the contri
bution that has been made to the ESOP.
Ho*
- 0.
(MO There is no statistically significant
relationship between company operating
performance and the period of time the
ESOP has been in existence.
Ho"
Ba — 0.
(5) There is no statistically significant
relationship between company operating
performance and the percentage of ESOPcovered employees who have vested
interests in the ESOP.
H 0 : Bi* = 0.
The hypotheses were tested by performing t tests on the
coefficients B^ of the explanators.

The results of the

t tests are given in Table 7 for the o perating income model
and in Table 8 for the net income model.
In Table 7, the results for the manufacturing
group are of special interest.

Recall that the Chow test
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TABLE 7
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS
(Criterion Variable:

Explanatory
Variable

Operating Income Ratio)

Regression
Coefficient

Standardized
Regression
Coefficient

.004

.095

1.073
1.991**

t Value

Pooled Data (N = 16S)
Xi

x2
xs

.025

.17 9

-.005

-.077

Xu

.004

.140

Constant

.797

-

.973
1.826*
3.387**

Manufacturing Comoanies
(N = 80)

x,

.006

X2

.aiH

.181

1.467

Xi

005

-.136

1.244

X,

.004

.215

Constant

.729

.215

-

1.757*

1.992**
3.351**

Trading Companies
CN = HO)

x*

-.006

-.102

.537

. 050

.282

1.560

Xi

.002

.033

. 207

x„

.011

.267

1.567

Constant

.222

Service Comoanies

-

.344

(N = 45)

xt

.005

.104

.519

Xz

.028

.132

.662

x,

-.014

.187

1. 083

Xu

.004

.096

.535

—

2.326**

Constant

*Significant at .05 level;

1.260

**Significant at .025 level

TABLE B
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS
(Criterion Variable;

Explanatory
Variable

Net Income Ratio)

Regression
Coefficient

Standardized
Regression
Coefficient

t Value

Pooled Data CN = 165)
Xi

-.003

-.040

.446

Xz

.030

.140

1.525

Xj

.009

.094

1.166

X.

-.004

-.090

1.153

Constant

1.S17

-

3.978**

Manufacturing Companies
CN = 80)
Xi
X2

.084

.657

.011

.058

.453

X3

.020

.205

1.796*

X,

-.001

-.025

Constant

.006

.972

-

.221
1.731*

Trading Companies
CN = *+0)
Xi

-.006

-.064

.319

Xj

.052

.178

.927

X3

-.005

-.040

.901

X*

-.013

-.192

1.071

Constant

2.611

-

2.320**

Service Companies (N 3 45)
Xi

-.009

-.205

1.029

X2

.050

.265

1.358

x3

-.001

-.012

.071

X..

-.003

-.098

.599

Constant

1.556

—

3.293**

*Significant at .OS level; ** Significant at .025 level
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indicated that pooling the data in this model is not
appropriate.

In the manufacturing group the null h y p o 

thesis was rejected at the

.05 level of significance

with respect to Xi and Bi > 0.

This result suggests that

there was a statistically significant positive rela t i o n 
ship between operating income and percentage of company
stock owned by the ESOP with respect to manufacturing
companies.

The null hypothesis was also rejected at the

.025 level of significance with respect to Xi» and B* > 0.
This result suggests that there was a statistically sig
nificant positive relationship between operating income and
the percentage of ESOP-covered employees who have vested
interests in the plan with respect to manufacturing co m 
panies.

Further,

Cbeta weights)

the standardized regression coefficients

indicate that Xi and X* were of equal

importance as explanators in the model for manufacturing
companies.
The null hypothesis H 0 :

= 0 cannot be rejected

in any of the other equations in Tables 7 and 8 .
manufacturing group of the net income model
was significant at the

.05 level.

In the

(Table 8 ), X 3

However, the Chow test

indicated that the data should be pooled in this model.
Consequently, the three tests that have been performed on
the two models indicate that statistically significant
relationships exist only for the manufacturing group in the
operating income model.
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Tests on the Assumptions of the Multiple
Regression Model
Since certain of the hypothesized relationships of
the study appear to exist in the operating income man u 
facturing company model, this model was further tested for
validity.

That is, tests were performed which would have

indicated whether certain assumptions of the multiple re 
gression model had been violated.

If an assumption was

violated the specified model could not be accepted as a
valid model.

The Assumptions
Murphy lists seven underlying assumptions for the
general multiple linear regression model containing k
exogenous variables and T observations:
Cl) The exogenous variables are fixed rather
than random so that ( X ’X) is a matrix of
real numbers, and the vector of values
for any X^, k = 2, 3 . . ., K is ind e 
pendent of the disturbance term.
(2)

For t a 1, 2, .
. ,, T, e+ is a normally
distributed random variable.

(3)

For t = 1, 2, .
of
is zero.

, ., T, the expectation

C4-)

F o r t = 1, 2, .
variance <r£.
t

. ., T, et

has a finite

(5) Noncontemporaneous disturbances are in
dependently distributed.
For any t i s ,
both t, s, = 1 , 2, . . ., T, ECs e ) = 0.
t s
(6) The number of observations exceeds the
number of coefficients to be estimated:
T > K.
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(7) The set of predetermined variables, X 2 ,
X 3, . .
X k are linearly independent
so that CX'X)-1 e x i s t s . 6
Murphy also notes generally that it is impractical
to check for all the assumptions because all possible sam
ples of the variables cannot be taken and the true parameters of the model cannot be k n o w n . 7

Nonetheless,

cer

tain tests can be performed on the sample data which are
useful in indicating that an assumption has been violated.
However, emphasis must be given to the fact that these
tests cannot be conclusive in verifying the assumptions.
The testable assumptions which are crucial in a
cross-section model are numbers

(4) and (7).

Number

is known as the assumption of h o m o s c e d a s t i c i t y .

CM-)

Assump

tion (7) refers to the linear independence of the explan
atory variables X^.

These two assumptions are further

explained and tested in the following two subsections.

Test for Homoscedasticity
The assumption of homoscedasticity refers to the
variance of the disturbance term e

in the model.

ically, the model requires that the variance of
stant.

Specif
be c o n 

Where the variance of e^_ is not constant, the data
t

are he t e r o s c e d a s t i s t i c .
The condition of heteroscedasticity ma y be detected
by examining the residuals e

6I b i d . , pp.
7I b i d . , p.

186-188.
85.

of the sample data where
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et = Y

- Y .

residuals

Specifically, Murphy suggests plotting the

against the estimated values of the endo-

genous variable Y . fl
egg timer shaped,

Murphy asserts that " . . .

V-shaped,

football shaped distributions,

indicate that VCe.)
t

etc.,

is not const a n t . " 9

Figure 1 shows a plot of e^ against

A
Y

operating income-manufacturing company model.

for the
Since the

plots do not assume the kind of shape m entioned by Murphy,
no evidence of heteroscedasticity is obtained.

Further,

the plots do not appear to form any particular shape.
This lack of shape in the plots also supports assumptions
(2) and (3).

That is, the residuals appear to be normally

distributed with mean zero.

Test for Multicollinearity
M ulticollinearity is a common problem in multiple
regression models and is related to assumption

(7).

Generally, multicollinearity refers to the existence of a
high degree of correlation among the exogenous variables
in a multiple regression model.
may be highly correlated.

For example, Xj and X 2

The condition can be illustrated

more generally as high correlation between
j * k.

aI b i d . , p.
9Ibid.

302.

and

where
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The precision of the estimated coefficients
is adversely affected when severe multicollinearity is
present.

Murphy describes the problem as follows:
In a multiple regression, the partial
regression coefficient is supposed to
provide the partial effect on the en
dogenous variable due to a unit change
in .the corresponding predetermined
variable holding the linear effect of
all other included variables constant.
However, when multicollinearity occurs,
each variable in the collinear set may
be sharing in the explanatory role of
any and all variables in the set.
Consequently, it is very misleading to
interpret the partial regression co
efficient. as the distinct effect of a
separate, individual varia b l e . 10

Since four of the five general hypotheses of this study
relate directly to the coefficients

of the specified

model, severe multicollinearity would be a particularly
serious problem.
A model can be statistically tested for the pre
sence of severe multicollinearity.

The test is based on

the matrix-vector concept of linear dependence.
tion (7), as mentioned, relates to this concept.
describes the assumption as follows:
The meaning of this assumption is that
no column vector of observations can
be written as a multiple of any other
column or as a linear combination of
any of the other observation vectors.
It is assumed that the predetermined
variables are independent of each other

1°Ibid., p.

369.

Assump
Murphy

Ill

so that each has a separate, measurable
effect on the endogenous v a r i a b l e . 11
Actually, as noted by Murphy, perfect dependency between
any two column vectors in a model is highly u n l i k e l y . 12
Such a condition of perfect dependency would mean that
the two exogenous variables involved would be perfectly
correlated.
As mentioned above, multicollinearity involves
high (not necessarily perfect)
exogenous variables.

correlation among the

Mathematically, multicollinearity

involves near dependency among the column vectors of the
matrix of the exogenous variables.

Viewed in this way,

the condition might also be described as a near violation
of assumption (7).
Multicollinearity or near dependency in the
matr ix of the exogenous variables can be detected by
statistically analyzing the simple correlation coeffic
ients of the model:
Dependencies among the predetermined
variables are reflected in the matrix
of simple correlation coefficients b e 
tween all pairs of these variables since
this matrix is calculated from the sim
ple moment m a t r i x . 13
The matrix of simple correlation coefficients is denoted
R* and Murphy notes that ".

“ Ibid.,

p.

368.

13I b i d . , p.

377.

12Ibid.

. .a

dependency among the set
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(X^) would imply that the determinant of R* is z e r o . " 11*
Further,

as noted by Murphy, the determinant of R* is one

C|R* | = 1) when no correlation is present among the
exogenous v a r i a b l e s . 15
The matrix of simple correlation coefficients
for the operating income-manufacturing company model is
presented in Table 9.

Murphy gives a chi-aquare test for

this matrix for which the null hypothesis is H 0:
where

{r *|

is the determinant of R*.

| R*|

= 0

The test statistic

is

X 2 = - [ T - 1 - C 1 / 6 X 2 K + 5)]
with K C K - D / 2

In Cl- | R*| )

degrees of f r e e d o m . 16
TABLE 9

OPERATING INCOME-MANUFACTURING COMPANY MODEL
SIMPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENT MATRIX

Variable
Xi

x2
x3
x.,

x2

x3

1.00000

.48256

.14209

-.08591

.4-8256

1. 00000

.19237

-.11191

.14209

.19237

1.00000

.04930

-.08591

-.11191

.04930

1.00000

Xi

1“I b i d . , p. 379.
1sIbid.
1GIbid.

X,
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The determinant of the matrix in Table 9 is .722.
Based on |R*j

= . 722 the calculated x 2 test statistic is

97.93 with 5(5-l)/2 = 10 degrees of freedom.
value of x 2

The critical

10 degrees of freedom from Fisher and

Yates is 2 3.2 09 at the

.01 l e v e l ,of significance and

29.588 at the .001 level of s i g n i f i c a n c e . 17
pothesis is thus rejected at the

The null h y 

.001 level of significance.

In summary, the assumptions enumerated above were
apparently satisfied b y the operating income-manufacturing
company model.

The methodology of the study supports

assumption (1).

The residual plot given in Figure 1

supports assumptions

(2),

Cno autocorrelation)

is generally not violated in cross-

sectional models.
Finally, assumption

(3) and (4).

Assumption

Assumption

(6) obviously holds

C5)

(80 > 5).

(7) is supported by the chi-square

test for muIticollinearity.

Summary
The sample data provided by the questionnaire sur
vey were analyzed in three phases.

First, the data were

analyzed to determine whether the sample should be pooled
into one group or disaggregated into subsets.

Second, the

five general hypotheses of the study were tested on the two
multiple regression models developed in the preceding

17Ronald A. Fisher and Frank Yates, Statistical
Tables for Biological, Agricultural and Medical R e s e a r c h ,
6th ed. (New^fork:
Hafner Press, 1963 ), pT 4 7.
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chapter.

Finally,

the operating income-manufacturing co m 

pany model was further tested to determine whether certain
basic assumptions of the general multiple linear r e g r e s 
sion model were violated.
The Chow test was used to determine whether the
sample should be pooled or disaggregated.

This is a test

of equality of coefficients among the subsets of observa
tions in a given regression model.

The test indicated

that the sample should be disaggregated into manufacturing,
trading and service company subsets in the operating income
model while pooling would be appropriate in the net income
model.
With respect to the first general hypothesis, R 2
was tested for significance for all eight regression eq u a 
tions that were generated in the study.

A regression eq u a 

tion was calculated for the pooled data and each of the
three subsets in both models.

The R 2 was statistically

significant for the pooled data and the manufacturing
group in the operating income model.

Since the Chow test

indicated that the data should not be pooled in this model,
the null hypothesis was rejected only for the operating
income-manufacturing company model.
The four remaining general hypotheses relate to
the explanatory variables in the multiple regression model.
These hypotheses were tested by examining the coefficients
of these variables.

Specifically, t tests were performed

on the coefficients w i t h the null hypothesis H 0 :

= 0.'
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Considering the results of the Chow test, the null h y p o 
thesis was rejected only for Xi and Xi, in the operating
income-manufacturing company model.

These tests suggest

that there is a statistically significant positive
relationship between operating income and these two e x 
planatory variables:
by the ESOP

percentage of company stock owned

(Xi) and the percentage of ESOP-covered

employees who have vested interests in the plan (Xi+).
The third phase of the data testing process
involved a further testing of the operating incomemanufacturing company model for validity.

That is,

further tests were performed to determine whether cer
tain underlying assumptions of the general multiple
linear regression model may have been violated.

An

analysis of the least squares residuals indicated that
the assumption of homoscedasticity was not violated.
Then the chi-square test for linear dependency indicated
that severe multicollinearity was not present in the
model.

The operating income-manufacturing company

model was, therefore, assumed to be a valid model.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY,

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This final chapter summarizes the study and p r e 
sents the conclusions that are based on the findings of
the investigation.

The chapter first summarizes the

details of the investigation which are contained in the
preceding five chapters.
are then presented.

The conclusions of the study

The third section of the chapter

contains a comparison of the results of this s t u d y to
the results of other relevant studies.

Finally, the last

section of the chapter gives some recommendations for
future research on the subject of E S O P s .
Summary
An employee stock ownership plan

(ESOP) is a

deferred compensation prog r a m that qualifies under the
Internal Revenue Code

CIRC) to grant tax benefits to

corporations and employees

of corporations.

A corpora

tion receives a tax benefit by transferring shares of its
own stock to a trust
of its employees.

CESOT) established for the benefit

The trust is not taxed on the receipt

of the shares nor on dividends paid on the shares.
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The

1X7

employees are not taxed until distributions from the trust
are received, and taxation at that time is favorable.
There are three different types of ESOPs.

Stock

bonus plans (SBPs) have been permitted by the IRC for
many years.

Pursuant to an SBP, a corporation makes

annual, deductible contributions to an ESOT.

Since the

ESOT can distribute employee benefits only in the form
of employer stock, the trust must convert its assets to
employer stock at some point prior to distribution un
less the contributions were made directly in the form of
employer stock.

Leveraged ESOPs were added to the IRC

in 19 74- by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA).

Under a leveraged ESOP, the ESOT obtains a

bank loan whi c h is generally guaranteed by the corpor
ation.

The proceeds of the loan are used to purchase

stock from the corporation which then makes a n n u a l ,
deductible cash contributions to the ESOT,

These cash

contributions are used by the ESOT to repay the loan.
Investment credit ESOPs were created by the Tax R e d u c 
tion Act of 1975.

An investment credit

ESOP permits a

corporation to

receive an additional 1% to 1 1/2%

investment tax

credit if it transfers shares

stock equal in

amount to the ESOT.

of its own

ESOPs have gained greatly in popularity since
197 4-.

The ESOP Council of America estimates that less

than 4-00 ESOPs were in operation prior to 1974.

By
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1978 "the number exceeded 2,200.

Accordingly,

the business

literature has given much attention to this topic since
1974.

This attention has raised man y issues which involve

several academic disciplines.
Since ESOPs are related to tax incentives, the
»

issue of tax policy has been raised.

Advocates of ESOP

tax incentives maintain that ESOPs benefit society by
increasing business efficiency.

This increased efficiency

is a result of increased productivity of workers who are
motivated by their participation in ESOPs.

However,

very

little empirical evidence is available to support this
position.
ESOPs involve financial accounting problems
relative to the balance sheet, income statement and sup
plemental disclosure.

Further,

all of the transactions

of an ESOP are potentially subject to SEC registration.
The most controversial accounting issue relative
to ESOPs is the reporting of the ban k loan which is i n 
volved in a leveraged ESOP.

Both the AIC P A and the SEC

accounting staff recommend that this debt be reported as
a liability of the sponsoring corporation.

The theory

supporting this approach is based on the doctrine of sub
stance over form.

That is, the loan is, in reality,

being made to the corporation since there is no economic
substance to the ESOT.

The opposing view asserts that

this debt does not generally conform to the accounting
definition of a liability and should be reported by the

119

corporation according to the provisions of Financial
Accounting Standard No.

5, "Accounting for Contingencies."

An ESOP might also cause a tax allocation problem.
If the contributions to an ESOP exceed the 15% limit* in a
given year, the excess can be carried forward and deducted
in a future year.

If this situation is viewed as a tax-

accounting timing difference,

a tax benefit w o u l d be

recognized and the deferred tax account would be reduced
in the year of the excess contribution.

However, the

AICPA recommends that such a carryforward should be
reported in conformity with APB Opinion No. 11 which
permits the recognition of a tax benefit only "when
realization is assured beyond any reasonable doubt."
A n ESOP can cause income statement problems
relative to the measurement of compensation expense, to
the calculation of earnings per share and to the account
ing for the additional investment tax credit.

Compensation

expense is recorded when an ESOP contribution is made.
APB Opinion No.

25 requires the compensation expense to

be based on the fair market value of the shares transferred.
In the case of a publicly-held corporation,
based on the quoted market price.

FMV is to be

If the stock is not

publicly traded the FMV must be estimated.

This estimate

should conform to the value that is determined for tax
purposes.

The AICPA and SEC accounting staff recommend

that all common shares held by an ESOT be included in
the EPS calculation.

This treatment is inconsistent with
t
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the reporting of the bank loan as a liability on the e m 
ployer's balance sheet.

However,

is contained in APB Opinion No.

a similar inconsistency

15, which requires con

vertible bonds to be reported as a debt on the balance
sheet and as common stock equivalents on the income state
ment under certain conditions.

Finally, the AICPA recom

mends that companies use the flow-through method in
accounting for the additional investment tax credit.
ever,

How

section lOlCc) of the Revenue A ct of 1971 permits

the use of either the flow-through method or the deferred
method in accounting for any investment tax credit for
corporations required to file financial reports with
federal agencies.
There are no authoritative disclosure rules p e r 
taining specifically to ESOPs.

However, a review of the

authoritative pronouncements which apply to other types of
employee benefit plans indicates that the minimum s up
plemental disclosure pertaining to an ESOP would be as
follows:
1.

A description of the plan and the employee
groups covered.

2.

A statement of accounting policies relevant
to the ESOP.

3.

The value of and number of shares contri
buted to the ESOP for each period for w h i c h
an income statement is presented.

The following ESOP transactions are potentially sub
ject to SEC registration:
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1.

Creating an interest in the plan for
a participant.

2.

The transfer of stock from the spo n 
soring corporation to the ESOT.

3.

The distribution of stock to a
participant.

4.

The subsequent
tributed stock

5.

The purchase by the ESOT of employer
stock from a shareholder of the spo n 
soring corporation.

sale of ESOT-disby a participant.

SEC registration will be required for each of the above
transactions unless

(A) the transaction is not within the

scope of the Securities Acts, or (B) the transaction is
subject to an exemption contained in the Acts.

A trans

action will not be within the scope of the Securities
Acts if the facts of the case indicate that no sale of
a security has taken place.

The SEC has generally

supported application of the "no sale theory" to ESOPs
where Cl) the participants

make no investment decisions,

(2) the trust does not purchase

the' stock and (3)

no

participant contributions are used to purchase stock.
The two specific exemptions most likely to apply to ESOPs
are the private placement exemption and the intrastate
offering exemption.

The private placement exemption

generally requires that the purchaser of securities be
in a position to obtain and understand all relevant
information about the issuer.

The intrastate offering

exemption requires that the issuer and the purchaser
reside in the same state.

The consequence of not
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registering stock contributed to an ESOT, however,

is that

the stock will be restricted in the hands of the distri
butee.

ESOT-distributed stock that is restricted cannot

be sold by the distributee to anyone other than the ESOT
for a period of two years after the stock has vested.
Before making an ESOP decision, management should
evaluate an ESOP in three areas.
should be analyzed financially.

First, the decision
Second, the possible

impact of an ESOP on organizational behavior should be
considered.

Third, an ESOP should be compared with

other alternative benefit plans.
Management should consider the financial impact
of an ESOP decision from the point of view of the share
holder group in existence prior to the implementation of
such a decision.

The impact of an ESOP on a firm's

cash flow, earnings, net assets and shares outstanding
will vary depending on the type of ESOP which is co n 
sidered.

The net effect of adopting a stock bonus plan

is the same as selling stock to the public and making
cash contributions to a qualified employee trust, unless
the SBP motivates the employees to become more produc
tive.

The net effect of a leveraged ESOP is the same

as obtaining a bank loan directly and making contribu
tions of stock to an ESOT over the t e r m of the loan.
However,

a leveraged ESOP can be useful in financing

certain transfers of ownership such as selling all or
part of a corporation to its employees.

Finally, the
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effect of an investment credit ESOP is that the government
purchases employer stock for the employees.

Financially,

taking the additional tax credit is equivalent to. selling
stock to the public unless there is no market for the
stock or the employees are motivated by their stock owner
ship.
An ESOP may affect organizational behavior by
motivating employees.

The motivation potential of an

ESOP seems to involve two questions:
1.

Are employees motivated by employee
ownership?

2.

Do employees perceive an ownership
interest flowing from an ESOP?

With respect to the first question, the expectancy
theory of motivation can be used as the basis for an
affirmative answer.

This general theory of motivation can

be expressed as f o l l o w s :

Motivation = CE

P)(P ■+■ 0)(V)

where E + P is the expectation an individual has that i n 
creased effort will lead to increased performance, P -*■ 0
is the expectation that the increased effort will lead to
some anticipated outcome and V (for valence) is the value
associated with the anticipated outcome.

Employee owner

ship strengthens the relationship between organizational
performance and personal reward because the employee,
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as an owner, benefits f r o m corporate p r o f i t . 1

Thus,

the

employee should place a h i g h valence on the a n t i c i p a t e d
outcome of increased corp o r a t e profits.
ship m a y motivate a workforce,

Employee o w n e r 

then, w h e r e the E -+- P and

P -*■ 0 expectancies are h i g h and whe r e pee r pressure can
be exerted.
The answer to t he seco n d q u e s t i o n w o u l d seem to
depend on h o w the ESOP is used by management.

The

holding of nonvoting stock or oth e r assets b y the ESOT
would p robably detract f r o m the m o t i v a t i n g effects of an
ESOP,

The same could be said of r e s t r i c t i v e vesting

requirements.

Further, the motiv a t i o n potential of an

ESOP would also seem to d e p e n d h e a v i l y on the e ffective
c o m m unication of the details and implications of the ESOP
to the e m p l o y e e s ,
The third are a of m a n a g e m e n t e v a l u a t i o n is the c om
parison of an ESOP w i t h the avai l a b l e alternative, benefit
plans.

As an employee b e n e f i t plan, an ESOP has bo t h co m 

pensation and retirem e n t characteristics.

If an ES O P is

to be used p rimarily as a c o m p e n s a t i o n plan,

it should be

compared to some type of n o n q u a l i f i e d bonus plan.

A bonus

plan pays employees a p e r i o d i c bonus b a s e d on eit h e r
organizational performance or individual performance.

1See Richard J. Long, "The Effects of Employee
Ownership on Job Atti t u d e s and Or g a n i z a t i o n a l Performance:
An E x p l o r a t o r y Study," Ph.D. Dissertation, Cornell
University, 19 7 7, p. 13.
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This alternative has motivation potential but avoids the
administrative complexities of a qualified plan.

If, on

the other hand, an ESOP is to be used as a retirement plan,
it should be compared to either a profit sharing plan or a
defined benefit plan.

These alternatives generally offer

employees more retirement security through a diversified
trust fund.

A thorough analysis, however, will reveal

that an ESOP has advantages for both employer and
employee when compared to these alternative plans.
The primary objective of this study was to provide
ESOP policy makers with empirical evidence which would be
useful in the formulation of future ESOP policy.
fically, the investigation attempted to reveal

Speci

(A) whether

any relationship exists between company operating perfor
mance and ESOPs and (B) the nature of any relationship
which might be found to exist.
This empirical investigation was carried out in
three phases.

First, an econometric model was formulated

which could be used to test the general hypotheses of
the study.

Second, the data for the model were collected

through a questionnaire survey of 1135 potential ESOP
companies.

Third, the data were analyzed and the hypotheses

were tested by statistically validating the model.
Considering the objectives of the study, the fol
lowing linear explanatory model was formulated:

Y , — $o

£31X1 + ^2X2

t 63X3

+ SitXi* + £
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where:
Y

Z!

company operating performance

-

the true coefficients of the model

e

=

the error term in the model

Xi

—

percentage of company stock owned by
the ESOP

x2 =

size (as a percentage of payroll) of
the prior year contribution to the ESOP

x3

period of time the ESOP has been in
existence

X- =

percentage of ESOP-covered employees
who have vested interests in the plan.

Two measures of company operating performance were used as
separate criterion variables to form two separate models
when each was regressed against the common set of explanators.

The first criterion variable consisted of the

ratio of operating profit with depreciation added back to
sales divided by the like ratio for the industry to which
the company belongs.

The second criterion variable used

after-tax net income instead of operating income with
depreciation added back.

The second criterion variable

permits the analysis to be made on an after-tax basis,
and a comparison of the two models might indicate that
ESOP tax benefits are more important than the indirect
effects of increased working capital and employee m o t i 
vation.
The general hypotheses of the study were as
follows:
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Cl) There is no statistically significant
relationship between company operating
performance and the ESOP-related
variables.
(2) There is no statistically significant
relationship between company operating
performance and the percentage of a co m 
p a n y ’s stock owned by the ESOP.
(3) There is no statistically significant
relationship between company operating
performance and the size of the con t r i 
bution that has been made to the ESOP.
C1*) There is no statistically significant
relationship between company operating
performance and the period of time the
ESOP has been in existence.
(5) There is no statistically significant
relationship between company operating
performance and the percentage of ESOPcovered employees who have vested
interests in the ESOP.
In general, hypothesis
explanatory power of the model.

(1) pertains to the overall
Each of the other four

hypotheses pertains to the significance of an explanatory
variable in the model.

These hypotheses were tested by

statistically testing the following null hypotheses r e l a 
tive to the m o d e l s :

Ho:

R2 = 0

H 0:

Bi = 0

Since the sample data represented company activity for the
year of 19 77, the analysis was cross-sectional in nature.
A questionnaire was sent to 113 6 potential ESOP
companies on June 16, 1978 wit h a follow-up mailing on
July 28, 1978.

Of the 1136 companies surveyed,

750 to
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85 0 are estimated to actually be ESOP companies.

A total

of 16 5 usable replies were received resulting in a response
rate of approximately 20%.

The replies were distributed

as follows:

Manufacturing companies

80

Trading companies

40

Service companies
Total usable responses

165

The sample was partitioned into these subsets to make the
analysis more useful.
The overall soundness of the data was tested in two
ways.

First,

in a test for nonresponse bias, thirty early

responses were statistically compared to thirty late
responses.
Second,

The test gave no evidence of nonresponse bias.

in a test for reliability,

financial data from

seven questionnaires returned by publicly-held corpora
tions were checked against information contained in
Standard and Poors Corporation Records and only rounding
differences were detected.
The data were analyzed in four phases.

First, the

least squares method was used to estimate the parameters
of the models.

Second, a test was performed to determine

whether the data should be pooled or disaggregated in the
models.

Third, the general hypotheses of the model were

tested in conformity with the results of the second test.
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Fourth, appropriate tests were performed relative to the
underlying assumptions of the general multiple linear
regression model.
Eight estimating equations were calculated using
the least squares method.

Equations were estimated for

the pooled data and each of the three subsets in both
models developed above,
The Chow test was used to determine whether the
data should be pooled or disaggregated in the models.
This test is a statistical test of equality of coeffic
ients in identical regression models using different
data sets.

The results of the test indicated that the

sample data should be disaggregated in the operating
income model and pooled in the net income model.
The general hypotheses of the study were tested
by statistically testing H 0 :

R 2 = 0 and H 0 :

on the appropriate estimated equations.

= 0

In accordance

with the results of the Chow test, these hypotheses were
tested on the three subset equations in the operating
income model and on the pooled data equation in the net
income model.
Statistically significant relationships were found
only in the operating income model for the manufacturing
company subset.

For this equation, R 2 was

.l^Hl which

was statistically significant at the .019 level.
the coefficients

Two of

were also statistically significant in
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this equation.
icant at the

Bi was a positive

.006 whi c h was signif

.05 level and Bt* was a positive

was significant at the

.025 level.

.004 which

These results indicate

a positive statistically significant relationship between
pretax operating income and the ESOP for manufacturing
companies.

Further, the significant variables in this

overall relationship are percentage of company stock owned
by the ESOP (Xj) and percentage of ESOP-covered employees
who have vested interests in the plan CXi*), which were
both positively correlated to the criterion variable.
In the final phase of the data analysis,

the

operating income-manufacturing company mod e l was further
tested for validity.

Two tests were performed to d e t e r 

mine whether certain underlying assumptions of the g en
eral multiple linear regression model were violated.
An analysis of the least squares residuals indicated that
the assumption of homoscedasticity was not violated.
Then the chi-square test for linear dependency indicated
that severe multicollinearity was not present in the model.
The operating income-manufacturing company model was
therefore assumed to be statistically valid.

Conclusions
The ESOP literature relevant to the study has
been reviewed.

This review has examined certain important

ESOP principles and issues.

Accordingly,

sions seem evident in this review.

certain con c l u 
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In the tax area, this investigation has revealed
that the proper choice of ESOP form is important.

Both

leveraged ESOPs and investment credit ESOPs must be
qualified under other IRC sections in addition to section
401.

An ESOP that does not comply with these additional

IRC provisions will not qualify for either leveraging or
the additional investment tax credit.

Perhaps even more

important is the conclusion that certain ESOPs should not
be qualified under IRC sections other than section 401.
That is, the basic SBP form should generally be used
where leveraging or the additional tax credit is not
desired.

SBPs are subject to fewer restrictions than

the other two forms and are, therefore,

a less compli

cated and more flexible ESOP mode.
In the area of accounting and financial r e p o r t 
ing,

several observations are apparent.

First, the

accounting practice of reporting the ESOP loan on the
balance sheet of the sponsoring corporation has eliminated
the possibility of using a leveraged ESOP as a method of
off-balance sheet financing.

This practice, then, has

possibly discouraged the use of ESOPs by both large and
small corporations.

Further,

the practice o f including

the ESOT-held shares in the calculation of earnings per
share has possibly discouraged the use of ESOPs by large
publicly-owned corporations.

The review of the securities

law applications to ESOPs revealed that employee contri
butions will probably subject an ESOP to SEC registration.

13 2
This problem may discourage non-SEC companies from taking
the extra 1/2% investment credit that is available in an
investment credit ESOP if employees make matching contributions.

Finally, the fact that unregistered stock is

restricted in the hands o f an ESOT distributee leads to
the conclusion that either the stock should be registered
with the SEC, or the distributee should be granted a put
option giving h i m the right to sell the stock bac k to
the company.
As to the management aspects of ESOPs, conclusions
are evident in all three areas of management analysis.
First, the general financial analysis of the three ESOP
forms revealed that the desirability of the leveraged
ESOP appears to be limited to specific t r a n s fer-of-owner
ship situations.

This conclusion is ironic, because the

current popularity of ESOPs is largely the result of the
19 74- legislation which made the leveraged ESOP possible.
Indeed, the te r m "employee stock ownership plan" was not
generally used until 1974.

Nonetheless, the SBP, which

has been available in the ta x law for ma n y years prior to
ERISA appears to be generally more attractive from a
financial standpoint than the leveraged ESOP.

Second,

the potential of an ESOP as a motivator depends on ho w
it is used.

In order to realize the full motivation

potential of an ESOP, management must be willing to
convey employee ownership through the ESOP.

This

investigation has revealed the several ways that employee
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ownership can be limited in an ESOP.

Stock bonus plan

ESOTs are permitted to invest in assets other than
employer stock.
stock.

All ESOPs are permitted to use nonvoting

SBPs and leveraged ESOPs can limit employee

ownership through vesting requirements.

These limita

tions on employee ownership could be expected to impair
the motivating effects of an ESOP.

Third, as an alt e r 

native to other possible employee benefit plans, ESOPs
have considerable merit.

An ESOP should probably be

used by a large corporation only as a supplement to
its conventional pension plan.

However, for a small

company, an ESOP may represent an affordable alternative
to having no employee retirement benefits beyond social
security.
Any conclusions to be formed from the results of
the empirical investigation are subject to the methodology
and data employed.

The met h o d was non-experimental.

The method did not involve pre-test/post-test procedures
nor did it employ a control group.
included only ESOP companies,
selected.

Since the sample

it was,

in a sense, self

These limitations preclude any inference of

causality and also limit the external validity of the
study..
The conclusions must also be tempered by the
nature of the findings.

Statistically significant

relationships were indicated by the operating incomemanufacturing company model.

The statistics, however,
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were far from overwhelming.
efficients were small.

The R 2 was low and the c o 

With statistical results such

as these the possibility of spurious relationships
must be

recognized.
Subject to these limitations,

then, the findings

of this investigation can be contemplated.

The results

of the statistical analysis indicate that ESOPs are
positively associated with operating profit for m a n u 
facturing-type companies.
cessors,

This category includes pro

fabricators, construction contractors as well

as conventional manufacturing companies.

The sign i f i 

cant variables in this overall relationship are X l3 per
centage of company stock owned by the ESOP, and X^, pe r 
centage of ESOP-covered employees with vested interests
in the plan.
The findings in favor of manufacturing companies
are not surprising considering the expectancy theory of
motivation reviewed in Chapter III.

In a manufacturing-

type company the nature of employee job tasks may
facilitate the motivating effects of an ESOP.

First,

in a manufacturing-type operation an employee has more
opportunity to increase his own productivity.

For

example, he can speed up a production process, or he can
reduce the waste of a raw material.

Second, there is

generally more teamwork involved in a manufacturing-type
operation.

Such an operation normally involves assembly

lines, work groups and processes that are interdependent.
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In expectancy theory terms, a manufacturing-type employee
would probably have greater E -*■ P and P

0 expectancies.

These observations are supported by the president of
Juice Bowl Products,

Inc., a juice canning company, who

made the following statement relative to the effects of
an ESOP on his company:
The opportunity to develop team effort through
ESOP appears to me to be endless.
There is
no employee who is not in a position to make
the company better if he is really motivated
to do so.
There is no one, from the bottom
up, who cannot improve his contribution if he
is constantly on the lookout for opportunities
. . . Downtime on a high speed production
line is no longer a chance for an extra
break.
Instead, it is lost earnings which
affects everyone's i n v e s t m e n t . 2
The two explanatory variables that were statisti
cally significant in the operating income-manufacturing
company model can also be related to the ESOP motivation
theory developed in Chapter III.

The reader should note

that the percentage of company stock owned by the ESOP
(Xi) included only common stock.

Accordingly, the theore

tical discussion in Chapter III indicated that the use of
securities other than than common stock might seriously
impair the motivating effect of an ESOP.

This theory may

explain why Xi was statistically significant and X 2 was

2Statement by Jack Grady, U.S. Congress, Senate,
Committee on Finance, Employee Stock Ownership Plans and
General Stock Ownership T r u s t s , Hearings on S. 3241,
ST 322 3 and H .R . 13 8 82 , 95th C o n g . , 2nd Sess., 1978
(Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing (Jffice,
1978) , p. 58.
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not.

The size of the prior year ESOP contribution

(X2 )

most likely included contributions other than common
stock.

Similarly, the theory in Chapter III indicated

that the use of restrictive vesting requirements might
also impair the motivating effect of an ESOP.

Therefore,

the statistical significance of Xt* (percentage of ESOFcovered employees who have vested interests in the plan)
is not surprising.
These findings have several pol i c y making impli
cations.

First, the results would support the general

encouragement of ESOPs through tax policy.

A n y increase

in the productivity of the manufacturing sector of the
economy would be socially desirable.

Second, the use of

common stock in an ESOP is supported.

Third, more liberal

vesting policies for ESOPs are supported.

Any corporate

management wishing to benefit from increased employee
motivation by forming an ESOP should consider using only
common stock which is subject to a liberal vesting schedule.
Tax policy makers should consider statutory provisions
which would encourage the use of common stock and liberal
vesting schedules in E S O P s .

Comparison to Other Studies
There are only two other studies with w h i c h to
compare the results of this study.

First, Conte and

Tannenbaum used a similar approach with a much smaller

sample.3

They tested an econometric model using data

from twenty companies and the results were similar to
the results of the operating income-manufacturing co m 
pany model in this study.

Their analysis indicated

a statistically significant R 2 and statistical signifi
cance for percentage of company stock owned by w o r k e r s .
Aside from sample size, there are four methodological
differences in the two studies.

First, the Conte and

Tannenbaum sample was not partitioned into subsets.
Second, their criterion variable consisted of the ratio
of pretax net income to sales divided by the like ratio
for the industry to which the company belongs.

Third,

their model did not include a variable for vesting.
Finally, their statistically significant explanator
involved only nonmanagerial personnel.

Considering

these methodological differences, then, the results
of the two studies seem to be fairly consistent.
The study of employee attitudes by Long is only
remotely comparable to the present s t u d y . 1*

The study

involved only one company which was directly owned by the
employees.

The results indicated an improvement of both

employee attitudes and organizational performance as a

3See Michael Conte and Arnold S. Tannenbaum,
"Employee-Owned Companies:
Is the Difference Measurable?"
Monthly Labor Review, July 1978, pp. 23-28.
^See Richard J. Long,

Op. cit.
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result of the change to employee ownership.

The two studies

are consistent in a very general sense in that they both
produced some positive findings relative to the effects
of employee ownership.

However, they are inconsistent

in that the Long study involved a service-type company,
and this study produced no positive findings with respect
to service-type companies.

Recommendations for Future Research
This study as well as the two studies mentioned
above all provided limited support in favor of ESOP for
mation.

However, they were all exploratory in nature.

Taken together as a whole, they are far from conclusive
in their findings.

These studies all suffered generally

from a paucity of available data on this subject.

The

ESOP phenomenon is new, and the total number of ESOP
companies is small.

Further, most of the companies

presently operating ESOPs have very limited experience
w i t h these plans.
If the current trend of increased ESOP formation
continues, more data will be available for future research.
The increased availability of data will enable future
researchers to design more sophisticated projects which
will overcome the weaknesses of these exploratory efforts.
Before-after approaches can be employed.
studies can be made.
sible.

Longitudinal

Control group designs will be po s 

These more sophisticated methods will possess
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greater internal and external validity and will make causal
inference possible.

In short, the problem of determining

the fundamental effects of ESOPs is open to a great deal
more research.
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CALipcmniA S tats UnivensiTy, F u LLsrtod_______
BJllemoa CAliFonniA 92634
DEPARTMENT OF ACCOUNTING
School o f Sunned Administration
end Eoonomla
(7I t ) 87Q-3S23

June 15, 1978
Dear Sir:
We are conducting a research study of the practical effects
of employee stock ownership plans fESOPs). We are attempting to
determine what direct and indirect effects operating ESOPs have
had on those companies that have adopted them as part of their
employee benefit programs. Specifically, our research i3 an
attempt to answer questions such as the following:
1.

Does an ESOP have a motivational impact on employees?

2. What direct and indirect effects does an ESOP have on
a company's profit performance?
3. Does the impact of an ESOP increase or diminish with the
passage of time?

U.

Are the effects of an ESOP different for different type3
of businesses?

We feel that our findings will be quite useful to corporate
policymakers with respect to their employee compensation decisions.
Accordingly, we will send you a sirniar? of our findings if vnu
will complete the enclosed questionnaire.
Please note that individual company identities and related
information will be kept confidential, and that our findings will
be reported only in aggregate form.
This research is being sponsored by the ESCF Council of America
and California State University, Fullerton. Tour cooperation in
completing and returning the enclosed questionnaire will be greatly
appreciated.
Respectfully yours,
vjL-a
Randy G. Swad
lecturer In Accounting

CSUF, as on Squat Opportunity Employer, is co»nni£ted to an A{$inmative Action
Poiiky which Involved positive action in the. hiring o$ ethnic minorities and
women.

The

C a U forttIa S tate

University

A nd Colleges
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CONFIDENTIAL SURVEY OF EMPLOYE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS
INSTRUCTIONS: Please provide the information requested to the best of your
ability. If you are unable (for any reason) to provide certain
informationf simply leave those items blank and fill-in as much
of the questionnaire as possible. Where appropriate, you may
provide reasonably accurate estimates,
Check here if you wish to receive a
include your name and address.

summary

of our findings and

COMPANY INFORMATTON!
1.

Amount of total assets reported on most recent fiscal year end balance sheet:
0 - 5250,000____________________ 510,000,000 - 550,000,000
____over $50,000,000

$250,000 - $1,000,000

$1,000,000 - $10,000,000
2.

Type of business:
_ _ _ Manufacturer

____Professional

_ _ _ Processor

Wholesaler

Construction

____Retailer

_____ Service

_____ Other

3.

What i3 your main product or service?

U.

What is the date of your most recent annual financial statements?

5.

Data from most recent annual income statement.
dollar amounts.
Sales or Service Revenue

1Q03,

You may give percentages or

5_________ _

Net Income
Operating Income

s ___________

Depreciation

_ _ _

ESOP Contribution
6.

$__________
$ ______________ _

Did you use LIFO inventory accounting in your most recent annual financial
statements?
Yes

No
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7.

Was the operating income on your most recent annual Income statement abnormally
high or low?
_ _ _ Yes

High

_

No

____ Low
If yes, what caused the abnormality?

_________

If yes, what was the approximate size of the abnormality as a percentage of
sales?

$
8.

Has there been a significant increase or decrease in the level of your
operating income since you initiated your ESOP?
Yes

_ _ _ Increase

____No

_ _ _ Decrease
If yes, what was the approximate size of the increase or decrease (for
example, 5$>increase):

H Increase

% Decrease

If yes, do you feel that this was related to the ESOP?
Yes

_ _ ^ No

PLAN INFORMATION
1.

What percentage of your company's common stock is held by the ESOP trust?
$

2.

What percentage of your company's coronon stock is held in trust for nonmanaaerial
employees?
J-

3.

What was the size of your ESOP contribution as a percentage of your ESCP-covered
payroll:
A)

For the most recent year?

%

B)

For the previous year?

£

1*

Row long had your ESOP been in existence as of the date of your most recent
financial statements?

5.

What percentage of the ESOP-cwned stock had been vested as of the date of your
most recent financial statements?
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6.

What percentage of your ESOP-covered employees had vested interests in the plan
as of the date of your mo3t recent financial statements?

$
7.

In your opinion, have the details of the ESOP been adequately communicated to
your employees?'
Yes

S.

_ _

Do the ESOP-covered employees vote the shares credited to their accounts
in the trust?
Yes

9.

No

No

Has the market value of your ESOP-ovmed stock changed since the inception of
the ESOP?
____ Increase

_ _ _ Decrease

No change

Percentage increase or decrease
EMPLOYES INFORMATION
_________

1.

What is the approximate average age of your ESOP-covered employees?

2.

Have you been able to detect any change in the following since the inception
of your ESOP?
A)

Annual employee turnover!
Percentage increase or

B)

Increase

increase or decrease

Percentage increase or

_____ Decrease

_ _ _ No change

£

Decrease

____ No change

decrease

£

Employee productivity (output):
_ _ _ Increase

Decrease

No change

%

Percentage increase or decrease
3-

_____ No change

Annual dollar loss from employee theft or waste:
_____ Increase

D)

Decrease

%

decrease

Annual employee absenteeism!
Percentage

C)

_ _ _ Increase

Were any changes indicated above related, in your opinion, to the ESOP?
<A)

(B)

(C)

(D)

4
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